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CITATIONS, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND THE
TROUBLED STATE OF LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
By: Jeffrey L. Harrison and Amy R. Mashburn*
ABSTRACT
Recent pedagogical, economic, and technological changes require law
schools to reevaluate their resource allocations. Although typically viewed in
terms of curricular changes, it is important also to focus on the very significant
investment in legal scholarship and its impact. Typically, this has been deter-
mined by some version of citation counting with little regard for what it means
to be cited. This Article discusses why this is a deeply flawed measure of im-
pact. Much of that discussion is based on an empirical study the Authors con-
ducted. The investigation found that citation by other authors is highly
influenced by the rank of the review in which a work is published and the
school from which the author graduated. Courts, on the other hand, are less
sensitive to these markers of institutional authority. Perhaps more importantly,
when the purpose of the citation is examined, a very small handful of those
citing a work do so for anything related to the ideas, reasoning, methodology,
or conclusions found in the cited work. This is slightly less true for judicial
citation compared to citations by other authors. Given the level of current in-
vestment in legal scholarship and findings that reliance on it is far lower than
citation counts would suggest, the Authors offer a number of recommenda-
tions designed to increase accountability of legal scholars and the utility of
what they produce.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to appreciate the unusual nature of legal scholarship, one
has only to imagine what another area of professional school-based
research—medicine—would look like if it followed the legal research
model. Almost all of the researchers will have graduated from a few
prestigious medical schools. Their fortunes (tenure, salaries, grants,
chairs, travel opportunities, accolades from colleagues, etc.) will be
largely dependent on placement of their research publications and ci-
tations to them. Those placement decisions, however, will not be
made by peer review, determination of adherence to accepted re-
search protocols, and assessment of the utility of the research to its
intended beneficiaries, but in large measure by the authors’ ability to
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catch the attention of second-year medical students.1 The students, be-
cause of their inexperience and acculturation to an elitist bias, will use
indicators of the author’s elite status as a surrogate for the quality
determinations they cannot make. The student editors are focused on
selecting articles that will generate citations by other researchers, not
necessarily because this will make the journal influential with or help-
ful to the consumers of medical services, but rather because these
numbers are used to rank their publication against its peers.
As for the content of the research, it is based entirely on the whim
of the researcher and is not determined by the pressing needs of the
consumers of medical services. Our hypothetical medical research’s
value will be measured instead by how many other similarly-situated
medical researchers cite to it and not by whether any consumers of
medical services and products are actually made better off. It will not
matter if those citations are to the substance of the research. In fact, it
is likely that, for example, an article advancing a radical new theory of
cell regeneration will have been cited most often for its accurate, non-
controversial list of the parts of a cell. At no point post-tenure will the
researcher be required to demonstrate that the research could with-
stand rigorous peer review or that it had proven useful to clinicians,
patients, drug manufacturers, etc. Now, imagine that year after year,
millions of dollars (much of it public money) were being invested in
this type of research. Finally, factor in that all of those very intelligent,
highly educated researchers are qualified and capable of using their
time and effort to help the consumers of medical services, but that
under the current system have no financial incentive to do so and may
pay penalties if their focus becomes too practical.2
This characterization of legal scholarship may be faulted for failing
to acknowledge what some might argue are offsetting positives, such
as the significant contributions many legal scholars have made that
have directly assisted legislatures, judges, lawyers, and clients, and the
1. Richard A. Wise posed a similar question: “Would you want The New England
Journal of Medicine to be edited by medical students?” Adam Liptak, The Lackluster
Reviews That Lawyers Love to Hate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2013, at A15, http://www
.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/us/law-scholarships-lackluster-reviews.html?_r=0.
2. No system is perfect. Medical research, even in the public context, may be
criticized as excessively market driven. More generally, some accuse “careerism” and
the stress to “publish or perish” as dominating academic life to the extent that scien-
tific research is often seriously “flawed,” “squanders money and the efforts of some of
the world’s best minds,” and “encourages exaggeration and the cherry-picking of re-
sults.” Problems with Scientific Research: How Science Goes Wrong, ECONOMIST (Oct.
19, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21588069-scientific-research-has-
changed-world-now-it-needs-change-itself-how-science-goes-wrong [http://perma.cc/
YH2R-4KFT]; see also, Alejandro M. Arago´n, A Measure for the Impact of Research,
3 SCI. REP. 1 (2013), http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/130411/srep01649/pdf/
srep01649.pdf [http://perma.cc/82TR-FMBE] (describing the increasing pressure to
publish as resulting in a flood of dubious scientific publications written for the pur-
pose of obtaining numerous citations by colleagues).
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intellectual or “public good” value of the publications.3 As is ex-
plained in the Sections that follow, an empirical study we have con-
ducted, among others, reveals that this description of legal scholarship
is, on the whole, neither unfair nor an exaggeration.4 Moreover, to the
extent that constituents other than law professors benefit in practical
ways from legal scholarship, those benefits are largely the product of
happenstance and individual preferences, rather than an intended by-
product of the existing structured system of incentives and disincen-
tives that sustains most of the tenured law professoriate.5
Legal scholarship has been the subject of criticism for decades, and
the negative assessments run the gamut from the substantive to the
stylistic. On the substantive end of the spectrum, perhaps the most
devastating critique is Professor Mark Tushnet’s conclusion that legal
scholarship is “marginal” and “lies at the edges of serious intellectual
activity.”6 As for stylistic deficiencies at the other end of the spectrum,
commentators have noted the awkward, ponderous style and unneces-
sarily fussy, distracting footnotes.7 Concerns about off-putting, exces-
sive theoretical content, and a lack of peer review probably fall
somewhere in the middle.8
Similarly, legal education has been subjected to an impressive array
of criticisms that range from the political to the pedagogical. As for
the political, law schools have been accused of being institutions that
replicate “illegitimate hierarchy.”9 From a pedagogical perspective, le-
gal education has been condemned for its lack of transparency and
3. See infra Section II.C.
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012); Deborah
L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1354–55 (“[L]egal scholars
face substantial obstacles to ambitious empirical research [and] confront correspond-
ing disincentives for unambitious but nonetheless useful work for nonacademic
audiences.”).
6. Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205,
1205 (1981) (analyzing the limitations inherent in the legal scholar’s role as having
their origins in advocacy and observing that he could not imagine “an intellectual
history of contemporary America in which legal thought would play an important
part”).
7. Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews—Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279, 281–82
(1962) (discussing law review writing style and commenting on “[l]ong sentences,
awkward constructions, and fuzzy-wuzzy words” and describing law reviews as “clut-
tered up with little numbers”); David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students:
Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/bus-
iness/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html (discussing the limited ap-
peal of law reviews).
8. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1337 (identifying the theoretical content as one of the
perceived problems with law review articles); Liptak, supra note 1 (explaining the
lack of peer review).
9. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIER-
ARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (A CRITICAL EDITION) i–ii (2004) (identi-
fying “the ways in which legal education contributes to the reproduction of
illegitimate hierarchy in the bar and in society”).
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accountability, adherence to ineffective pedagogy, excessive cost, and
failure to adequately prepare students to enter the practice of law.10
With a few notable exceptions, however, critics of legal education
have not focused much on whether—and precisely how—the short-
comings of legal scholarship are contributing to the problems with le-
gal education more generally.11 This Article posits that the two sets of
concerns are fundamentally related, and that any serious effort to re-
form legal education must include critical evaluation of the resources
invested in legal scholarship and consideration of whether at least
some of those resources should be redirected and managed
differently.
Towards that end, this Article identifies, through empirical analysis,
fundamental problems with legal scholarship. Three findings are par-
ticularly important. First, citation of articles by law professors is highly
correlated with the ranking of the review publishing the article and—
in the eyes of other law professors—the prestige of the author’s insti-
tutional affiliations.12 Articles published in reviews that are not highly
ranked, or in specialty reviews, are cited so infrequently that it re-
10. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) (reviewing law school pedagogy, comparing that
pedagogy with the pedagogy of other professional schools, and making recommenda-
tions regarding the assessment of student learning); Judith Welch Wegner, The Car-
negie Foundation’s Educating Lawyers: Four Questions for Bar Examiners, B.
EXAMINER, June 2011, at 11, https://law.ubalt.edu/academics/pdfs/Carnegie%20Re
port%20article_final.pdf [http://perma.cc/G5Q7-ZW65] (presenting “key insights
from the Carnegie Foundation’s study on legal education, Educating Lawyers: Prepa-
ration for the Profession of Law, commonly known as the Carnegie Report, published
in 2007, while also incorporating information about related developments in law
schools that have occurred in ensuing years” (footnote omitted)); Law Grad Sues
Law School for Lack of Transparency, VAULT BLOGS (May 31, 2011), http://www
.vault.com/blog/vaults-law-blog-legal-careers-and-industry-news/law-grad-sues-law-
school-for-lack-of-transparency [http://perma.cc/G5CD-F3ZA] (reporting that a for-
mer Thomas Jefferson School of Law graduate sued the school “seek[ing] over $50
million in damages[,] alleg[ing] fraud; negligent misrepresentation; and violations of
the Unfair Competition Law, False Advertising Act, and the Consumer Legal Reme-
dies Act. Among the suit’s assertions is that Thomas Jefferson has provided ‘false and
misleading’ employment data to U.S. News & World Report for its annual law school
survey”); Segal, supra note 7 (discussing ineffective pedagogy and the failure to pre-
pare students to practice).
11. For examples of some commentators who have focused on the problems with
legal scholarship in this regard, see, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 5, at 54–61 (arguing
that law schools should “critically examine the cost of the legal scholarship frenzy”
and questioning whether it is appropriate that “law students are forced to pay for the
production of scholarship at current levels”); Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Ex-
cesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV. L. REV. 926, 932–40 (1990)
(noting that “the limited value of legal scholarship as it appears in law reviews is
largely outweighed by its costs”); Rhode, supra note 5, at 1330 (noting that “broader
issues” are behind concerns about legal scholarship, including “the role of law and
legal education and their relationship to legal scholarship,” and questioning “to what
extent should students in a professional school acquire and subsidize knowledge
about the role of law that will have little immediate relevance to their practice?”).
12. See infra text accompanying note 81.
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quires one to question whether those works, regardless of quality, are
worth their costs.13 Finally, when cited, it is rare to find evidence that
the citing work actually relied on or was influenced by the cited
work.14
Part II of the Article sets the stage for the empirical study by: (1)
describing some of the factors that work together to maintain the sta-
tus quo; (2) estimating the amount of the current annual monetary
investment in this type of scholarship; and (3) identifying and assess-
ing common justifications advanced in defense of the status quo. Part
III explains the methodology of the Article’s empirical study of legal
scholarship citations and describes the study’s findings. Part IV ana-
lyzes the study’s findings and explains why they undermine the two
prevailing justifications for the shortcomings of legal scholarship.
Among other things, the data: (1) reveal why legal scholarship should
not be presumed to be beneficial based on citation counts as evidence
of “impact”; and (2) suggest that the “public good” rationale for the
level of resources invested in legal scholarship has been exaggerated.
Part V makes several practical recommendations based on the study’s
findings for modifying the nature of the investment in legal scholar-
ship and encouraging the production of legal publications that may be
helpful to constituents other than law professors.
Perhaps it is worthwhile to make note of a disclaimer at this junc-
ture. Although what follows is a serious attack on the usefulness of
legal scholarship generally, it is not a criticism of any individual effort.
Despite their critique, the Authors read and enjoy legal scholarship as
much as any other within the profession. That observation, however,
captures the theme of what follows: legal scholarship, in its present
form, is a massive and unsupportable investment in what benefits a
few people in a narrow universe.
II. THE STATUS QUO AND JUSTIFICATIONS BY ITS DEFENDERS
A. The Current State of Legal Scholarship
Although things could be (and have historically been) otherwise,
the current state of legal scholarship is the result of a strong synergis-
tic relationship among a number of interrelated forces working to-
gether to maintain the status quo. Most modern ABA-accredited law
schools have adopted and perpetuated what may be loosely described
as a graduate school model of legal education.15 One consequence of
13. See infra text accompanying notes 78–79.
14. See infra Section III.A.5.
15. Between 1965 and 2010, the total number of ABA accredited law schools went
from 135 to 200. Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963–2012 Academic Years, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_ad
missions_to_the_bar/statistics/enrollment_degrees_awarded.authcheckdam.pdf [http:/
/perma.cc/2RJ7-4GRL]. The new law schools had tenured faculties with publication
requirements. This added many new manuscripts to the number being submitted
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this adoption is the need for law schools to conform to the university’s
system of tenure and for law faculty to have credibility as academics.
This means that at most law schools, most faculty members are not
appointed because of their expertise as legal practitioners, but rather
because of their academic success at a few elite law schools and a
favorable assessment of their potential as scholars.16 Because tenure
requires peer review, and upward mobility for law teachers requires
impressing other law professors17 (ideally, at higher-ranked law
schools), the content of legal scholarship must demonstrate the au-
thor’s proficiency with applying theory18 and avoid the telltale faults
of being too practical, doctrinal, or descriptive.19 Tenured faculty,
above all else, must be scholars.20 In the odd alchemy of the politics of
legal education, being concerned about the practicalities of any aspect
of legal education—classroom pedagogy, skills instruction, the stu-
dents’ preparedness to practice law, whether public money is being
spent responsibly, or the reasonableness of the investment in legal
every year for publication. Id.; TAMANAHA, supra note 5, at 31 (describing how, in
response to demands to make legal education more flexible and relevant to law prac-
tice, “[l]egal academics across the country continue to insist on the uniform model of
legal education,” which includes “law faculties predominantly staffed by scholarly
professors eligible for tenure”).
16. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Labor Market for New Law Profes-
sors, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–2, 20–21 (2014); Scott Jaschik, Hiring Them-
selves, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2013/11/13/study-finds-law-schools-perpetuate-elite-legal-education-values-faculty-
hiring [http://perma.cc/7WZQ-D7MP]; ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR
LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 134 (2007); Richard E. Redding,
“Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the Professoriate and its Impli-
cations for Legal Education, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 594, 594–95 (2003).
17. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1352 (attributing some of the limitations in legal schol-
arship to “faculty interests in status, recognition, and autonomy” and noting that
“[b]eneath the veneer of academic freedom lies a convenient measure of scholarly
self-indulgence”).
18. Id. at 1337 (asserting that “[t]he ‘high theory’ that carries the greatest prestige
for legal scholars is of the least interest to practitioners”).
19. Segal, supra note 7; Henry T. Edwards, The Growing Distinction Between Le-
gal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992). Some argue that
law professors’ lack of practice experience is also a reason why their scholarship has
such a strong theoretical perspective. David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why
There Should Be Fewer Articles Like This One: Law Professors Should Write More for
Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761, 766–70
(2005). The following is illustrative of the level of repugnance law professors voice for
the doctrinal scholarly enterprise, even when they are endeavoring to defend it:
In one way or another, the presenters all suggest that this kind of scholarship
is passe´, unprofitable, perhaps even pernicious. I want to take issue with this
theme, and to offer a sketch of a defense of traditional legal scholarship. I
will frankly confess at the onset that doctrinal analysis isn’t something that I
especially enjoy doing or reading. But I do think that doctrinal analysis has a
valuable and even central place in legal scholarship.
Steven D. Smith, In Defense of Traditional Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Schle-
gel, Weisberg, and Dan-Cohen, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 627, 627 (1992) (footnote
omitted).
20. TAMANAHA, supra note 5, at 55–56.
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scholarship—is something to be avoided.21 Ironically, to be successful,
law teachers should not be too concerned about teaching.22
One final factor was necessary to create and maintain the current
idiosyncratic state of legal scholarship: student-edited law reviews.23
Simply put, law professors needed law reviews in order to obtain ten-
ure.24 Students select which articles will be published and, through the
editing process, have a significant influence over which articles are
cited in the articles they publish.25 Each of these processes—article
selection and editing—is a powerful force in shaping legal scholar-
ship.26 Studies show that students select articles by assuming that the
credentials of the authors and the status of the schools at which they
teach signal not just reliability but also the likelihood of citation by
other law professors, whose value assessments will presumably be sim-
ilar.27 Through this process, they have also made manifest the profes-
soriate’s elitist preference for theory.28 As editors, the students adhere
to an arcane and pedantic set of attribution rules that demand support
for almost every statement in an article. This assures that there will be
many citations to various works and that most of them will not be
substantive or represent an affirmation by the author of the article for
the substance of the cited work, but rather a harried law student’s
judgment that the citation “supports” the statement in the text.29
B. An Estimate of the Investment in Legal Scholarship
It is impossible to know with certainty the cost of legal scholar-
ship.30 It is, however, possible to make a series of assumptions that
21. Id.
22. Segal, supra note 7 (“[T]here are few incentives for law professors to excel at
teaching. It might earn them the admiration of students, but it won’t win them any
professional goodies, like tenure, a higher salary, prestige or competing offers from
better schools. For those, a professor must publish law review articles, the ticket to
punch for any upwardly mobile scholar.”).
23. Christian C. Day, The Case for Professionally-Edited Law Reviews, 33 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 563, 563–66 (2007) (discussing the history of student-edited law
reviews).
24. Id. at 566.
25. See generally id.
26. Richard A. Wise et al., Do Law Reviews Need Reform? A Survey of Law
Professors, Student Editors, Attorneys, and Judges, 59 LOY. L. REV. 1, 9 n.29 (2013);
Jason P. Nance & Dylan J. Steinberg, The Law Review Article Selection Process: Re-
sults from a National Study, 71 ALB. L. REV. 565, 568 (2008).
27. Wise et al., supra note 26; Day, supra note 23, at 575–76 (discussing how the
selection process is biased); Nance & Steinberg, supra note 26, at 571–72.
28. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1328, 1337, 1342.
29. For an amusing description of what this process produces, see Rhode, supra
note 5, at 1334–35.
30. Segal, supra note 7 (“[M]uch of academia produces cryptic, narrowly cast and
unread scholarship. But a pie chart of how law school tuition is actually spent would
show an enormous slice for research and writing of law review articles. . . . Last year,
J.D., or juris doctor, students spent about $3.6 billion on tuition, according to Ameri-
can Bar Association figures, accounting for discounts through merit- and need-based
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lead to a conservative approximation.31 Assume there are 200 law
schools with 30 faculty each, for a total of 6,000 law professors. In
addition, assume each one earns $160,000, which includes fringe bene-
fits in the range of 30%. Finally, suppose each school assigns its
faculty 12-hour teaching loads, which are then reduced to 9 hours to
allow for scholarship production.32 These assumptions result in an es-
timation of $960 million per year in law faculty salaries. One-fourth of
that figure—$240 million—can be attributed to the production of
scholarship.
Certainly effective teaching requires some level of research and per-
haps the $240 million should be discounted to allow for that. This is
not, however, a compelling argument, for the following reason. Sup-
pose the average law teacher works 40 hours a week and is expected
to engage in the preparation of legal scholarship one-fourth of that
time due to a one-fourth reduction in teaching load. That leaves 30
hours a week to prepare for class and to be in the classroom for 4 or 5
hours. This leaves ample time for any research necessary for teaching
excellence.33
The estimate of $240 million is likely conservative since it only con-
siders professors’ salaries and a constant 9-hour teaching load. Period-
ically, however, even when professors teach only 4 or 5 hours a week,
many schools offer sabbaticals and research leaves that further reduce
teaching loads. Scholarly efforts also require the expense of operating
one to several publications, article submission costs, research assistant
payments, secretarial salaries, photocopying expenses, and so on. An
important expense not accounted for is the opportunity cost of not
having professors in the classroom, where they are more able to focus
aid. Given that about half of a law school’s budget is spent on faculty salary and
benefits, and that tenure-track faculty members consume about 80 percent of the
faculty budget—and that such professors spend about 40 percent of their time produc-
ing scholarship—roughly one-sixth of that $3.6 billion subsidized faculty scholarship.
That’s more than $575 million.”); see Robert Steinbuch, On the Leiter Side: Develop-
ing a Universal Assessment Tool for Measuring Scholarly Output by Law Professors
and Ranking Law Schools, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 87, 119–22 (2011) (discussing the
costs of publication); Karen Sloan, Legal Scholarship Carries a High Price Tag, NAT’L
L.J. (Apr. 20, 2011), http://blogs.luc.edu/mediaclips/files/2011/05/The-National-Law-
Journal-Legal-scholarship-carries-a-high-price-tag-4.20.11.pdf [http://perma.cc/KZ6L-
UP76]; Orin Kerr, Estimating the Costs of Legal Scholarship, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Nov. 21, 2011), http://volokh.com/2011/11/21/estimating-the-costs-of-legal-scholar-
ship/ [http://perma.cc/LRW6-Z72G].
31. Readers may adjust the factors if they are not in accord with their
assumptions.
32. TAMANAHA, supra note 5, at 39–43 (discussing how “vigorous advocacy” by
law professors “produced a long-term trend of pushing down teaching loads while
salaries went up” and also noting that although the nine-hour load became common,
in practice many professors had loads of 6.71 hours or two courses per year).
33. We do not know if an average law professor teaching a nine-hour yearly load
actually does spend thirty hours a week preparing to teach and teaching. To the extent
it can be done effectively in less than thirty hours, such a professor’s actual release
time for teaching is more than the quarter time we have posited here.
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on their teaching. Obviously, this would be offset by the benefits of
legal research. But if those benefits are as low as suggested by the
research reported here, it is hard to believe that they would not be
exceeded by the benefit to the students of smaller classes, more indi-
vidual attention, and a more expansive curriculum.34
C. Justifications
1. Four Common Flawed Justifications of Legal Scholarship
Tenured law professors have reacted in various ways to criticisms
and reform initiatives that threaten the status quo. At least one survey
indicates that many professors are critical of the flawed law review
placement system and are “dissatisfied with the effects of law reviews
on their careers.”35 On the other hand, and perhaps predictably, many
seem less welcoming of reform efforts that are directed at aspects of
the existing legal education system that favor them.36 We have en-
countered or expect to encounter the following justifications for the
current state of legal scholarship. Whether these views are widely
shared or representative of only a vocal minority remains to be seen.
a. Speculation and Examples Prove Influence Beyond
Other Law Professors
The most predictable response of law professors to criticisms re-
garding infrequent citation of scholarly legal publications is to assert
that they “know” legal scholarship enjoys a wide readership despite
the lack of citation and believe that lawyers, judges, agency staffers,
etc., read law review articles and find the content helpful.37 These op-
34. TAMANAHA, supra note 5, at 52–53 (noting that student tuition pays for law
professors’ salaries, course reductions, summer grants, etc., and that if allocations for
research were dropped and more teaching required, law school budgets could be
“slashed”).
35. Wise et al., supra note 26, at 69 (reporting that among those surveyed, law
professors were among the most critical of the current system).
36. TAMANAHA, supra note 5, at 30–31 (describing how law professors couch this
defensiveness in terms of their “selflessness”); Id. at 28–36 (describing the battle be-
tween the Association of American Law Schools (“AALS”) and American Bar Asso-
ciation (“ABA”) over proposed changes that would have allowed more non-tenure
track hires at ABA-accredited law schools).
37. See, e.g., Dan Rodriguez, Scholarship Funding: Why and How, PRAWFSBLAG
(Feb. 25, 2014, 11:02 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/02/scholar
ship-funding-why-and-how.html [http://perma.cc/37L7-UY9B] (defending the subsidi-
zation of legal scholarship on several grounds, including that “legal scholarship can
and does help shape the law in constructive directions, can help shed illuminating
light on difficult legal and policy puzzles, and can help advance important societal
goals”) (“To be sure, at its worst, legal scholarship is banal, remote from considera-
tions of both the bar and the academy, and is overwrought. The same can be said of
bad judicial opinions, bad statutes, and bad work product in nearly every field. . . .
Choose your favorite example. The work of environmental law scholars from the 70’s
and 80’s helped transform modern environmental law; actual people benefited from
these efforts. The work of constitutional lawyers helped propel the cause of marital
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timistic academics are unconcerned with the results of studies showing
a lack of citations because they can imagine any number of ways that
their scholarship might have proven useful and are able to point to
examples of articles that they assert have been “transformative” of an
area of law.38 One wonders if what is actually meant is that the alleg-
edly transformative work has transformed an area of legal scholarship,
rather than an area of law.
Undoubtedly, law professors influence and alter the thinking of
other law professors. For all that is known, however, this phenomenon
may be most akin to generating climate change in a terrarium. For the
purposes of this Article, the core question is: How much of legal
scholarship’s transformative power actually makes its way outside the
academic dome? The answer is not apparent, but clearly this trans-
formative effect is not a phenomenon to be conveniently presumed
into existence or created by conflating scholarly debates about law
with the actual operation of law in society. The temptation to do the
latter is great because as Professor Tushnet has observed, “[t]he intel-
lectual marginality of legal scholarship is all the more striking in light
of the immense role that law plays in American society.”39
Whatever its causes, however, the justification is essentially not only
faith-based but also anti-intellectual. Its proponents are notably unin-
terested in discovering the truth of these assertions through any form
of verification. What verification there is points in the opposite direc-
tion: Law professors are writing largely for one another and have few
readers outside academia.40 It is also a logical fallacy to point to the
existence of a (relatively speaking) few transformative scholarly works
as justification for the thousands of articles subsidized and produced
every year.41 The unstated premise is that if a few articles have a de-
monstrable transformative effect, many more articles must be having
the same effect. This is a faulty generalization and, based on our re-
search, not one that should be accepted without some kind of verifica-
tion.42 Moreover, even if it were true that law review articles enjoy a
equality in the past fifteen years. The work of libertarian legal scholars and political
economists are helping shape the debate over eminent domain in the post-Kelo world.
The list is a long one. The value of legal scholarship should be judged by its best
practitioners, not its worst excesses.”).
38. See, e.g., id.
39. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 1205.
40. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1336–37 (noting the results of a survey that showed
that “[o]ver two-thirds of surveyed attorneys had consulted law reviews fewer than six
times in the preceding six months; over a third had not consulted them at all”); Wise
et al., supra note 26, at 71 (finding that judges and lawyers read law reviews
infrequently).
41. See infra text accompanying note 50.
42. For an argument maintaining that it is “naı¨ve” to believe that legal scholarship
is influential on actors outside academia and asserting that the “actual effect of a law
review article on the behavior or decisions of judges, let alone other governmental
actors, is quite limited,” see Benjamin H. Barton, Saving Law Reviews from Political
Scientists: A Defense of Lawyers, Law Professors, and Law Reviews, 45 GONZ. L.
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wide readership, it would not mean that the current level of subsidiza-
tion is reasonable and that continuing to invest millions of dollars in
scholarship without some tangible evidence of this influence consti-
tutes responsible management of resources.
b. Tenure and Academic Freedom Compel Non-Accountability
Law professors are very quick to detect and defend against per-
ceived encroachments on tenure and to claim that their academic free-
dom is being infringed upon.43 Given the level of demonstrated
sensitivity to these issues, we anticipate that merely advocating put-
ting into place incentives that encourage change in the content of legal
scholarship and its intended audience will be criticized as an infringe-
ment on academic freedom. Tenure and academic freedom are indeed
related,44 but the academic freedom argument in this context is disin-
genuous, confuses ends and means, and may be just a tad paranoid.
Those concerned about the level of investment in legal scholarship
are hardly interested in muzzling law professors. Expression would
not become the grounds for discipline in any form. Law review articles
could be written on any topic appealing to the law professor. Instead,
the issue is whether, with limited funds, a law school is required to
REV. 189, 205–06 (2009–2010) (reviewing ROBERT J. SPITZER, SAVING THE CONSTI-
TUTION FROM LAWYERS: HOW LEGAL TRAINING AND LAW REVIEWS DISTORT CON-
STITUTIONAL MEANING (2008)).
43. TAMANAHA, supra note 5, at 28–32, 36 (describing the AALS reaction to ABA
initiatives to allow schools to hire full-time, non-clinical faculty in non-tenure track
positions and the “fierce defense” of tenure mounted by law professors); Victor
Fleischer, The Unseen Costs of Cutting Law School Faculty, DEALBOOK N.Y. TIMES
(July 9, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/the-unseen-costs-of-cutting-
law-school-faculty/?_r=0 (arguing that firing tenure-track faculty for budgetary rea-
sons “encroaches on an important principle of academic freedom, namely that a ten-
ure decision should be based on the merit of the case, not the budget of the
department”).
44. See Gregory M. Dickinson, Academic Tenure and the Divide Between Legal
Academia and Legal Practice, 6 DARTMOUTH L.J. 318, 330–35 (2008) (explaining that
tenure was designed to ensure that the scholar “was free to research and study as he
saw fit and to publish his findings” and “free from administrative interference regard-
ing his teaching duties”); Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Academic Tenure: An
Economic Critique, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 545, 546 (1991) (acknowledging that,
“[w]hile tenure can save out-of-pocket expenses [and] promote independence from
outside forces,” these justifications do not surmount the effects, as tenure also “in-
creases overall costs, decreases flexibility, disenfranchises the paying consumer of ed-
ucation, increases dependence on unaccountable insiders, and makes it nearly
impossible to remove incompetent and unnecessary professors”); James J. Fishman,
Tenure: Endangered or Evolutionary Species, 38 AKRON L. REV. 771, 772 (2005)
(“The original purpose of tenure was to provide economic security, so that scholars
could pursue disinterested scholarship and be judged on that scholarship by their
peers, rather than by lay employers. Of course, tenure is much more: it implicates
notions of academic freedom, justifies participation in university governance, repre-
sents part of a social contract that contributes to institutional stability, and—not so
often acknowledged—manifests a significant status function that in the law school
context reinforces a hierarchy among people in similar fulltime roles.”).
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subsidize any and all expression by a law professor. If the answer to
this question is “no” (and it must be since this is what happens today),
the negative impact on academic freedom is already present. Indeed,
it would be an infringement not to allow three-hour teaching loads so
that law professors could express themselves even more. People who
really believe the academic freedom argument would not only be of-
fended by teaching loads that prevent even more writing, but also by,
among other things, the refusal to allow faculty to teach very low en-
rollment courses, the imposition of limits on travel funding that would
support expression at conferences, and limited access to research
assistants.
More importantly, tenure and academic freedom are means to an
end. Surely that end cannot be to allow law professors to write unpub-
lished haikus (the production of which may actually be more benefi-
cial than some legal scholarship) or to do anything involving
expression. There is no principled difference between limiting the sub-
sidization of some research and not paying faculty to teach any possi-
ble course even if enrollment is near zero. The uncomfortable fact is
that limited funding means that schools are already making decisions
about which “freedoms” faculty are going to be paid to exercise. Con-
sequently, the academic freedom argument is simply one in favor of
the status quo without any principled connection to actual academic
freedom, funding limits, or accountability.45
c. Other Disciplines May be as Bad as Law
This is a broader version of the argument that has been raised previ-
ously against proposals to subject law review articles to the peer-re-
view process more typical of other disciplines.46 It can be employed to
argue, in essence, that reform efforts are hopeless because legal schol-
arship would simply trade one set of problems (e.g., article selection
bias by students) for another (e.g., article selection bias by peers).47
Clearly, other disciplines have their problems with research and publi-
cation,48 and we do not advocate adopting any other discipline’s
model without modification.
On the other hand, it is hardly productive to assume that other dis-
ciplines are as troubled as law and, therefore, can provide no guidance
whatsoever on how to improve legal scholarship. Given the unique
45. For an argument that decisions regarding the retention of tenure-track faculty
should be immune from economic considerations, see Fleischer, supra note 43.
46. See infra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
47. See Barton, supra note 42, at 191 (responding to criticisms of legal scholarship
by a political scientist by writing an article purporting to show that the critical book
“proves that peer-reviewed political science scholarship suffers from at least as many
faults and foibles as law review scholarship” and questioning whether that “make[s]
political science scholarship worthless too? Or is that just how the journal-world
works?”); see also infra text accompanying notes 126–27.
48. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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history of legal education, including the developments that gave rise
to student-edited law journals as the primary outlet for legal scholar-
ship, it is difficult to imagine another discipline similarly lacking in
peer review, oversight, and accountability, coupled with high salaries
for the scholars.49 The amount of money being expended on legal
scholarship is high, as is the volume of research being subsidized be-
cause of the high numbers of tenure-track law professors who are sub-
ject to the “publish or perish” imperative. The benefits of legal
scholarship to any constituent group (other than law professors) are,
as our study demonstrates, attenuated at best. Furthermore, even if it
were true that some other discipline’s scholarship was in the same
condition as law, that sad reality would not excuse the legal academy’s
failure to address its deficits and manage its resources more
efficiently.50
d. Students Benefit from Editing Journals
Some defenders of the status quo will point to the importance of
providing students with the experience of editing journals as a reason
not to change.51 This argument is weak for a number of reasons. First,
if the experience of screening and editing articles is of such great ped-
agogical value to law students, then why not provide it for all of the
students rather than only a small percentage? Second, if the tasks ac-
tually performed by the students are pedagogically important, other
less expensive ways exist for students to develop reading and editing
skills than having law schools support, on average, two or more jour-
nals. Finally, under the current system, students are involved in repli-
cating bias in the selection process. The educational value of allowing
students to perpetuate a selection process that may lower the benefi-
cial impact of legal research is not clear.
This is not to say, however, that students are at fault. They cull
through thousands of articles (sometimes to no avail since the same
articles have been submitted to dozens of other reviews), edit articles,
chase down footnotes for professors too important to include them
themselves, and deal with the authors’ delicate egos.52 In return, stu-
dents receive a promise that this may increase their chances of em-
ployment and a minimal number of credit hours (for which they must
pay). In many respects, they do what professors are required to do in
other disciplines. Although law students clamor for this privilege, the
49. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 1356 (asserting that the editorial structure of law
reviews is “unlike most other disciplines”).
50. Id. at 1333 (“[O]ther disciplines have done better in controlling quality while
curbing quantity, and comparable strategies are available for legal scholarship.”).
51. For a discussion of how participation in the editing process is beneficial for
students, see Day, supra note 23, at 567.
52. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1357 (acknowledging the “countless hours of free as-
sistance by captive labor willing to salvage sloppy scholarship and muddled syntax”
that law professors receive from student editors).
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troubling bargain struck seems remarkably similar to that made by
college athletes.
2. Two Additional Justifications
a. Legal Scholarship is Beneficial
This is an appealing, and perhaps the only defensible, justification
for legal scholarship. At the same time, however, at its most compel-
ling, it is not a justification for the current level of investment, and, at
its worst, it may be deeply hypocritical. What this appeal is really
about is brought into question by two facts. First, at no point is a law
professor required to articulate the actual connection between the re-
quested subsidization and the welfare of others. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, it appears this laudable purpose has been perverted
into the notion that the value of scholarship is commensurate with the
number of times it is cited.53 Thus, the benefit of writing is frequently
now referred to as “impact,” and impact is assessed by counting cita-
tions, typically by other law professors.54
We have heard the adage: “Most writing exists to be read; legal
scholarship exists to be written,” but have been unable to track down
its source. The statement seems incomplete. Legal scholarship exists
to be written and cited. Indeed, citations have become the ubiquitous
unit of measurement for a number of purposes in legal scholarship.
Some law school administrators collect citation statistics from their
tenure-track faculty and use these numbers in their assessments as evi-
dence of the scholarship’s impact and the scholar’s influence and rep-
utation. Law professors tout their scholarship citation statistics as a
significant achievement55 while seeming to put aside that it is gener-
53. See, e.g., Albert H. Yoon, Editorial Bias in Legal Academia, 5 J. LEGAL ANAL-
YSIS 309 (2013) (reporting the results of a study finding that law professors place
lesser-cited articles in the law reviews of the school at which they teach and equating
lesser citations with lower quality); Ronen Perry, The Relative Value of American
Law Reviews: Refinement and Implementation, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1, 8 & n.28 (2006)
(stating that his empirical results were based on the notion that “[w]henever a person
thinks [a statement in a law review article] merits an explicit reference, it may be said
that the article inspired or influenced further writing, and therefore had some impact”
and that more citations signaled more impact). However, Dr. Perry makes no attempt
to verify the assumption that those “explicit references” are substantive and, there-
fore, meaningful before attributing “impact” to them. See Perry, supra note 53, at 8
n.28.
54. Perry, supra note 53, at 8.
55. This counting mentality has been encouraged by the Social Science Research
Network (“SSRN”), which does not simply make articles available to readers but ac-
tually ranks authors by numbers of downloads and prepares elaborate top ten lists.
Interestingly, though, download patterns reflect a powerful bias in favor of articles
found in top ranking law reviews. James Ming Chen, Modeling Citation and
Download Data in Legal Scholarship (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-25,
2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=905316 [http://perma.cc/KY7C-BA2S] (advocating that
law schools should embrace bibliometrics as a preferred alternative to more subjec-
tive assessments of law journals and law schools’ prestige and influence).
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ally accepted that citations to law review articles in general are not
high.56 In fact, law reviews are ranked on the basis of their citations
counts—some call this “impact factor,”57 and others propose to mod-
ify it in various ways.58
These attempts to import “impact factor” analysis from other disci-
plines into law by counting citations to legal scholarship are ironic,
given that when one looks just a little beneath the surface and consid-
ers the factors that actually generate those numbers and the qualita-
tive nature of the citations themselves,59 they are unrelated to any
56. Segal, supra note 7 (observing that there are more than 600 law reviews in the
United States, and they publish about 10,000 articles a year) (“A 2005 law review
article found that around 40 percent of law review articles in the LexisNexis database
had never been cited in cases or in other law review articles.”); Thomas A. Smith, The
Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 336 (2007) (finding that 43% “of articles are
not cited at all, and about 79% get ten or fewer citations”).
57. Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking Explained, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. OF
LAW, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/method.asp#methodology [http://perma.cc/F739-
WPHA]; Robert M. Jarvis & Phyllis Coleman, Ranking Law Reviews by Author
Prominence—Ten Years Later, 99 L. LIBR. J. 573 (2007); Law Review Rankings,
PRAWFSBLAWG (July 21, 2011, 12:58 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2011/07/law-review-rankings.html [http://perma.cc/JG8L-7QAN] (“[T]he Washington
& Lee Law Library . . . offers a ranking of law journals based on total citations and
‘impact factor[ ]’ . . . . [Impact factor] in the larger scholarly world is a widely-used
metric of the quality of journal editors’ judgment; it represents the mean number of
citations per article per year for the journal. It’s not actually a great measure, since it
tells us nothing about the quality of the citing articles, and reputation probably pro-
duces [impact factor] as much as the other way around.”); Robert Anderson, That’s
Right: Yet Another Post on Law Review Rankings, WITNESSETH: LAW, DEALS, &
DATA (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:01 PM), http://witnesseth.typepad.com/blog/2013/02/thats-
right-yet-another-post-on-law-review-rankings.html [http://perma.cc/FRQ9-YF88]
(commenting on Google Scholar Metrics’ ranking of law reviews). See generally Lisa
Hackett, Understanding Law Review Success: An Analysis of Factors that Impact
Citation Counts (Spring 2013) (unpublished seminar paper), http://www.law.msu.edu/
king/2012-2013/Hackett.pdf [http://perma.cc/LX8U-X2XW] (discussing the role of ci-
tations in the legal community, the article selection process, the impact factors, and
how law reviews can select articles to maximize their citation impact factors).
58. See, e.g., Steinbuch, supra note 30 (proposing modifying the Leiter impact fac-
tor by considering the publishing school’s U.S. News and World Report ranking, call-
ing this process “The Protocol”); Perry, supra note 53 (looking at total citations to 186
law reviews and proposing a ranking system).
59. In this respect, citation counts are like student evaluations of teaching. It is
also ironic that other disciplines are also dealing with the problem that cites do not
measure impact. See Arago´n, supra note 2 (proposing an alternative measure that
does not focus on raw citations). See generally Eugene Garfield, Address at the Inter-
national Congress on Peer Review and Biomedical Publication: The Agony and the
Ecstasy—The History and Meaning of the Journal Impact Factor (Sept. 16, 2005),
http://garfield.library.upenn.edu/papers/jifchicago2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/FT8F-
7PHE]; Jennifer Howard, Humanities Journals Confront Identity Crisis, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 27, 2009, at A1, http://chronicle.com/weekly/v55/i29/29a00102
.htm [http://perma.cc/86J7-JTU2]. Reliance on the numbers of SSRN or direct library
downloads is flawed for the same reason. While they might provide some indication of
readership, one cannot know for what purposes the articles are being downloaded or
by whom. For a recent example of the circularity of citations equals impact thinking,
see Gregory C. Sisk et al., Scholarly Impact of Law School Faculties in 2015: Updating
the Leiter Score Ranking for the Top Third (Univ. of St. Thomas (Minn.) Legal Stud-
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measure of benefit except the status of the professors, their schools,
and law reviews themselves. In fact, as the results of the study de-
scribed below explain, at almost every level, these numbers are part of
a cycle that replicates an elitist bias that generates not-very-meaning-
ful high numbers for a small number of law professors and signifi-
cantly disadvantages most others.60 To make matters worse, not only
is citation not a measure of impact,61 some of the citations studies are
flawed at the simple task of counting citations in that they focus exclu-
sively on a few of the highest ranked law reviews and perpetuate an
elitist bias.62 Any study seeking to assess and justify the large expendi-
ture on legal research must be designed to look at what is going on
more broadly, or as one might say, in the lower decks of the Titanic.63
b. The “Public Good” Rationale
Even if all legal scholarship were beneficial, its subsidization must
nonetheless be justified. When law professors assess legal scholarship
from a “cost vs. benefits” perspective, they fill in this justification gap
by seeming to agree that legal scholarship is a “public good.”64 A
“public good” is one that produces benefits that cannot be fully inter-
nalized by the producer. This leads to free riding and a disincentive to
ies Research Paper No. 15-12), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2642056. There, the authors
defend equating the number of citations with impact but have no independent basis
for determining impact. In effect, the idea that citations equal impact is non-falsifiable
and, thus, faith-based.
60. See infra Part III.
61. The citations themselves are most often non-substantive and do not represent
reliance upon or even consideration of the cited author’s thesis or main points. See
infra Section III.A.5.
62. See, e.g., Ian Ayers & Frederick E. Vars, Determinants of Citations to Articles
in Elite Law Reviews, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (2000); Alfred L. Brophy, The Signaling
Value of Law Reviews: An Exploration of Citation and Prestige, 36 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 229 (2009); Dennis J. Callahan & Neal Devins, Law Review Article Placement:
Benefit or Beauty Prize?, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 374 (2006) (examining articles from the
journals ranging in rank from first through fortieth); Sisk et. al., supra note 59.
Even the relatively simple process of counting can go awry. For example, one re-
cent effort counts the editors of books of readings as authors of all articles found in
that collection. In addition, in an effort to rank schools based on scholarly “impact,”
the works of faculty who wrote nothing at the ranked schools are included. Finally,
this sort of counting attributes citations and, thus, impact to those who edit treatises
or are added as coauthors without any effort to determine whether the material cited
originated with the newcomer. Id.
63. One particularly troublesome study seems to overtly equate “good” articles
with the number of citations an article receives. Callahan & Devins, supra note 62, at
384 n.24 (“For the purposes of this study, good, ordinary, and bad articles are mea-
sured simply by their efficiency in attracting citations.”).
64. Edward Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?, 17 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139, 151 n.30 (2008) (“[T]here is little doubt that scholarship is a
public good that the markets will under-supply.”); Rodriguez, supra note 37 (“How-
ever, if we start from the premise that scholarship is a public good which qualifies for
significant financial support, we have at least framed the debate as about how best to
go about supporting this work . . . .”).
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produce the good in the first place. They compare legal scholarship to
clean air and national security.65 Several legal scholars have extended
this reasoning and argue that law schools should not only be en-
couraged to produce their fair share of legal scholarship but should
also be penalized if they fail to do so.66
Casually characterizing legal scholarship as a public good does not
advance the analysis very far. First, it cannot be used to justify all in-
vestment in legal scholarship. The fact that something is a public good
does not mean it makes sense to produce it. All production uses up
some resources, so the public good argument must be accompanied by
an assessment of what will not be produced if the putative public good
is produced. Second, the fact that a good or service has a public good
character does not necessarily mean it will not be produced without
the subsidization of tuition and tax payers. Finally, even though legal
scholarship may, in theory, be a public good, it is hard to justify the
current level of subsidization if, in fact, no one cares to free ride be-
cause the work is irrelevant.
65. Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law School Rankings: Solutions to Coordina-
tion and Collective Action Problems, 77 TEX. L. REV. 403, 418 (1998) (“[Legal] schol-
arship is a public good, meaning that consumption of it by one person does not leave
less for others and that the cost of excluding free riders from consuming it is prohibi-
tive. The creation of a scholarly work is usually funded by a single law school, while
the benefit is shared by scholars (or sometimes lawyers, judges, students, or legisla-
tors) everywhere. Why would an institution with any sense of fiscal responsibility pay
professors substantial salaries so that they can spend a good part of their time creating
knowledge upon which the rest of the world can free ride? The answer is that the
institution would not. Instead, it would pay professors only to spend their time doing
work that creates a benefit the school could capture for itself.” (footnote omitted));
Rubin, supra note 64, at 153 (“But legal scholarship, to the extent that it does have
value, must necessarily be regarded as a public good. Like clean air or national secur-
ity, it is a product whose benefits cannot be limited to particular recipients. It cannot
be supported by a simple market mechanism, but must be provided by some form of
collective action. Buying research is not like buying fish; it is necessary to support the
general enterprise and see what it produces for society as a whole. In the short run,
therefore, support for research seems inefficient. In the long run, however, there is no
substitute for academic research, and, as an enterprise, it is [sic] has transformed the
world.” (footnote omitted)).
66. Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn from Billy Beane
and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1516–17 (2004) (reviewing MICHAEL
LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003)) (“Legal schol-
arship fits the definition of a public good because ‘consumption of it by one person
does not leave less for others and . . . the cost of excluding free riders from consuming
it is prohibitive.’ As with public goods generally, a collective action problem develops
regarding the decision to produce legal scholarship. A mechanism needs to be
adopted that will penalize those schools that fail to produce enough of the public
good, and transfer that benefit to those schools that produce more than their fair
share.” (footnote omitted)); Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Le-
gal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 143 (2006) (“A ranking based
on a school’s intellectual environment should encourage schools to produce legal
scholarship, a valuable public good, and a ranking based on emerging ideas will create
an incentive to be part of new fields.”).
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Despite the foregoing concerns, we return to reassess these two jus-
tifications—the benefits of legal scholarship and the public good ratio-
nale—after reporting the findings of an empirical study which shed
further light on their validity.
III. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY
A. Methodology and Findings
1. Methodology
The sample for the empirical component of this paper was approxi-
mately 400 articles published in 2003.67 All articles came from publica-
tions generated by The Top 100 Law Schools as listed by U.S. News
and World Report in 2003.68 The decision was made to use law school
ranking as opposed to law review ranking because law school rankings
appeared more stable. Whatever error this introduces, if any, is not
likely to be of great consequence.69 In addition, using law review rank-
ings, which are largely based on some version of citations, seemed to
be a poor choice given that the reviews themselves may select articles
based on the number of citations likely to be generated. In the follow-
ing comments, we will use the ranking to refer to both schools and law
reviews, although it is more precise when referring to a review to iden-
tify it as “the review associated with the school ranked # x.” The no-
tion of a “random sample” struck us as an unworkable concept in this
context since necessary decisions about the universe of articles in-
cluded already render the sample nonrandom. Consequently, the sam-
ple was purposely designed to overstate the impact of legal
scholarship. As is true with respect to all decisions we made, others
are invited to replicate the process to determine if the selection pro-
cess biased the results in a meaningful way.
It became apparent that the sample should be subdivided into three
groups. The first group was composed of 198 articles. This number
includes two articles from each of the principal law reviews associated
with the top 100 schools. One school reported not having a law review
in 2003.70 Thus, the sample in this group was reduced from 200 to 198.
A second group was comprised of articles published in specialty re-
views. Because some of the schools in the sample did not publish a
specialty review, this part of our sample was trimmed to 93. The last
group of works consisted of student notes or comments found in the
67. The actual date of publication could not be determined with precision because
dates listed as publication by law reviews are not always consistent with the dates of
actual availability.
68. See Best Graduate Programs: Schools of Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Apr. 14, 2003, at 70, 72, EBSCOhost ISSN: 0041-5537.
69. The most attractive alternative law review ranking approach would be that
published by Washington and Lee University. See Law Journals: Submissions and
Rankings Explained, supra note 57.
70. This was Northeastern University School of Law.
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principal reviews of the top 100 schools. Since law schools are not
completely consistent with the labels “note” and “comment,” an effort
was made to select only extended works on topics other than a specific
case.71
For each work, Westlaw was employed to determine the number of
total citations, judicial citations, and citations found in secondary
sources.72 The citation search extended for almost a decade, until mid-
2014.73 In addition, for the 198 works found in principal law reviews,
200 citations to those works were examined to assess the use to which
the cited work was put by those citing it. A “control group” of 100
additional citations was also selected from articles published in 2001.
2. Findings
Table 1 provides an overview of what this methodology produced.
The table is self-explanatory, but it indicates that the total number of
cites to the principal articles was 6,564; to student works, 841; and to
works in specialty journals, 1,461. Judicial citations in each category
were very low relative to citation in secondary works. On average,
principal articles were cited .63 times each by courts and 35 times each
in secondary sources. For student works and works in specialty jour-
nals, these averages fell off dramatically.
Averages, however, can be misleading. For example, 73 of the prin-
cipal articles were responsible for all judicial citations of works in that
category. Thus, 125 were not cited by any court at any level over the
ten-year period examined. In the specialty journal group, 9 out of 93
articles accounted for all the judicial citations. In the case of citations
by secondary sources, averages are not as deceiving because all but a
small handful of the principal articles and specialty journal articles
were cited at some point.
As one might expect, citations were not evenly distributed within
the sample of 99 principal law reviews. We made an arbitrary distinc-
tion and compared citations to the articles appearing in the top 15
reviews with the citations to works in the remaining 84 reviews.74 Half
of the articles in the group of 15 reviews had judicial cites while 25%
of those in the larger group had judicial cites. The top 15 reviews were
responsible for 35% of all judicial cites, while the remaining 84 re-
views accounted for 65% of the cites. Publishing in a top-15 review
doubled the likelihood that a work would be cited by a court. Interest-
71. The full data set is quite long and available from the Authors.
72. These numbers likely include a number of self-citations.
73. It would be unrealistic to expect an article to be cited in the year of publica-
tion. Consequently, the time period covered is probably closer to nine years.
74. The top fifteen were Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Columbia, NYU, Chicago, Cali-
fornia, Duke, Michigan, Cornell, Pennsylvania, Northwestern, UCLA, Texas, and
Georgetown.
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ingly, publishing in a top-15 review nearly quadrupled the likelihood
of being cited by another scholar.75
Table 1
Articles Student Works Specialty Rev.
(198) (99) (93)
Total Cites 6564 841 1461
Total Judicial 126 15 20
Total Secondary 6438 826 1441
Average Judicial .63 .15 .20
Average Secondary 35.5 8.2 14.6
A series of bar charts further disaggregates the data. The first two
charts pertain to the 198 articles found in the principal law reviews.
Chart 1 shows the total numbers of each type of total, judicial, and
secondary cites as each group of 10 journals is added to the total.
Chart 2 illustrates the marginal impact of adding 10 more journals.
The first bar in each chart is for the top 10 law schools as ranked in
2003. In Chart 1, the second bar is for the top 20 and so on through all
the reviews examined. In Chart 2, the second bar is for journals 11–20
only. What is clear from these two charts is that articles published in
the higher ranking reviews were cited more often and that, as one
goes to lower ranked reviews, citations fall.76
This drop off in citations is significant. For example, the top 10 arti-
cles were cited 1,500 times over a ten-year period for an average per
article of 150 times, or an average of 15 times per article per year. In
the 10 articles in the 80–99 group, for example, the total citations were
180, or 18 times per year, or 1.8 times per article per year. In short, the
likelihood of someone being cited who placed an article in a top-10
journal was over 7 times as likely as a person publishing in an eighty-
fifth-ranked journal. It is important to note that what is captured here
relates to the top 99 law reviews. The drop off in citation rates as one
moves to reviews associated with schools ranked 100 to 200 may be
even greater.
Three aspects of this examination surprised us, although perhaps
they should not have. One is the vast difference between citations by
courts and citations in secondary sources at every level of review. This
could be attributed to the fact that the number of articles far exceeds
the number of written judicial opinions. But this does not account for
the low absolute number of times courts cite legal scholarship.77 The
75. Top 15 placements averaged 75 cites per article while placement below the top
15 averaged 20 cites per article.
76. This is generally consistent with the result published recently by Professor
James Chen. See Chen, supra note 55, at 39–47.
77. As will be discussed below, even these numbers may overstate the impact of
legal scholarship. See infra Section III.A.4.
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second surprising finding is the paucity of citations to lower ranked
reviews. The third is the discrepancy between citation rates based on
the rank of the school.
One explanation for the third finding relates to the common strat-
egy among law professors to submit their articles to higher ranked
reviews before working down the pecking order. This means editors at
higher rated reviews have more articles from which to choose. Inter-
estingly though, the rank of the school played a less important role in
judicial citation, possibly meaning that what law professors and stu-
dent editors believe to be the most relevant articles is not the same as
what courts believe to be the most useful. Or put differently, with a
smaller pool of articles to choose from, editors at lower ranked re-
views are almost as effective as their counterparts at highly ranked
schools at selecting articles that courts will find useful.
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In the case of specialty journals, as one would expect and Chart 3
illustrates, all types of citations increase as more journals are added.
And, as shown in Chart 4, marginal citation rates do not reflect a
steady decline,78 although a slight downward trend is discernable. We
do not believe the marginal rates are very useful for a number of rea-
sons. The most important of these is that we were unable to find a
reliable source of specialty journal ranking that extended to 100 jour-
nals. Consequently, we ranked specialty journals on the basis of the
rank of the law school with which they are associated. Further compli-
cating the process is that it is not clear which specialty journal is the
most prestigious within each school. Second, the numbers of citations
are so low that a single outlier can easily raise the number of its group
of ten. The small numbers also mean the charts are less useful when
examining judicial cites. In fact, with only 20 judicial cites for 93 arti-
cles over a ten-year period, perhaps all that can safely be said is that
specialty journals are rarely cited by courts and are cited by secondary
sources only 16% as often as articles in principal reviews.79
3. Regression Analysis
The statistical analysis focused on three dependent variables: cita-
tion by courts, citations in secondary sources, and total citations. The
independent variables were the rank of the law review at which the
article was published, the rank of the school employing the author at
78. It is important to remember that the tenth group of 10 includes only 3 reviews.
79. We did not produce similar charts for student notes. The numbers of citations
involved, especially judicial cites, were miniscule. In addition, citation rates to student
notes, whether high or low, would likely not have implications for law school invest-
ment in scholarship.
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the time the article was published, and the rank of the school from
which the author received his or her J.D. degree. For purposes of the
second two independent variables, the schools were classified as elite
or non-elite, and a “dummy” variable was used. The top 15 schools
were assigned a value of 0 and the remaining schools a value of 1.
Obviously, with respect to student notes, only the rank of the review
could be used.
We feel certain that other variables affect citation rates. The omit-
ted one that concerns us most is subject matter.80 For example, one
would expect articles in constitutional law, criminal law, or civil proce-
dure to be cited more often than articles on legal history. It is, how-
ever, very difficult to precisely define subject matter categories and
then classify an article as fitting into one category or another. In addi-
tion, it is possible that some areas are cited more frequently simply
because there are more articles in that area.
As noted above, the complete sample was subdivided into three
smaller samples. The first was composed of 198 articles published in
2003. Two articles were selected from each of the principal publica-
tions of the top 100 ranked reviews. The analysis revealed that the
rank of the review and the rank of the school from which the author
graduated were positively correlated with the number of total cites
and secondary cites. These correlations were statistically significant.81
In the case of judicial citation, none of the variables performed as
well. More specifically, based on this sample, we could not accept or
reject a hypothesis that a correlation existed between judicial citation
and the rank of the review, the rank of the author’s employment, or
the rank of the school from which the author graduated.
The same set of dependent and independent variables was applied
in the case of 93 articles found in specialty journals. Here, it is again
important to note that the independent variable was the rank of the
school. Since many schools have more than one specialty journal, this
meant selecting one of those journals. Further, unlike principal law
reviews, the rank of which closely tracks the rank of the school, the
same cannot be said with any confidence about specialty reviews.
80. Michelle M. Harner & Jason A. Cantone, Is Legal Scholarship Out of Touch?
An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Scholarship in Business Law Cases, 19 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (reporting the results of an empirical study that looked at 200
business law decisions rendered by the Delaware courts from 1997–2007 and found
consistent citation of legal scholarship by courts).
81. They were significant at a 95% confidence level, meaning that that we are 95%
sure that the citation rates were positively influenced by the rank of the journal and
the school from which the author graduated. Measures of collinearly indicated that it
was not a factor.
With respect to total cites the regression coefficient on journal rank was -.58 with a
standard error of the estimate of .08. The coefficient on the rank of school graduated
from was 9.84. The standard error was 4.85. With respect to secondary cites, the re-
gression coefficient on journal rank was -.55 with a standard error of .081. The coeffi-
cient on rank of school graduated from was 8.83 with a standard error of 4.64.
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Here the three independent variables had the predicted direction of
influence, but the levels of confidence, although high in some cases,
were not quite as high as in the case of principal reviews. Both the
rank of the law schools publishing the journal and the rank of the
school from which the author graduated played a role in determining
the total and secondary source citations to these works.82 An interest-
ing aspect of this is that, since we did not rank the secondary reviews
independently of their publishing schools, “branding” alone appeared
to play a role in citation frequency. We could not conclude that judi-
cial citations correlated with any of the variables in the model.
The results associated with student works were similar. The actual
number of cites was quite small, and there was no correlation between
judicial cites and the rank of the law review. There was, however, a
statistically significant relationship between citations to student works
and the rank of the review in which they were published.83
4. What it Means to be Cited: Judicial
As noted at the outset, we are deeply suspicious of citation counts
as measures of impact. Consequently, we decided to examine what it
means to be cited. More specifically, we posed the question: “To what
extent does citation mean influence?” To determine this, 100 instances
in which a court cited an article were examined.84
The sample of 100 was chosen by examining one instance of citation
for the first article in the sample that was cited by a court and then
continuing down the list of articles that were cited by courts. Student
works were not included. The list of 300 was exhausted before 100
judicial citations were found, which meant returning to the top of the
list and finding second instances of citation for some articles. In effect,
some of the citations examined in the sample of 100 were to the same
articles.
Determining how to classify an article in terms of its impact is
highly subjective, and it was first assumed that the ranking would be
along a relative scale ranging from influential, to moderately influen-
tial, to not influential. By actually examining citations, another more
specific method of assessing impact was discovered. As it turns out,
citations seemed to fall into one of three categories. In some instances,
82. For “total,” the regression coefficient for rank of school was .09 with a stan-
dard error of .05. The t-value was 1.92, meaning there is a 6% chance that the rela-
tionship found in the sample would not hold for the population generally. For the
rank of the school from which the author graduated the same statistics were 5.2, 2.97,
1.76, and 8%, respectively. For citation in secondary sources, the statistics were (in the
same order) as follows: (1) rank of school: -0.085, 0.047, -1.812, and 7%; and (2) rank
of school from which author graduated: 4.66, 2.69, 1.73, and 8.7%.
83. The regression coefficient on rank of review was 9, and the standard error was
1.7.
84. Fifty additional cites were examined as part of a “control group.” See infra
Section III.A.6.
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a court was actually responsive to the theme or reasoning of an au-
thor. In other cases, the court relied solely on the descriptive elements
of an article. In other words, the analysis of the author was beside the
point. Finally, in some cases an article was cited in a string citation and
it was not clear that the court relied on the reasoning or any specific
information in the article. In these instances it appears that the cita-
tion was merely to indicate the author was among a group of people
writing on the topic.
Of the 100 citations examined, there were 18 instances in which the
author’s reasoning appeared to be influential. Fifty-four citations were
to the descriptive elements of the article cited. Specifically, the court
in no way referred to the author’s reasoning or thesis. Finally, in 28
instances the citation did not appear to influence the opinion or serve
as a source of information.
Examples are useful in understanding how these classifications were
made.85 An article falling in the first category was Einer Elhauge’s
Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants Are Not Preda-
tory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power.86 In
a 2004 antitrust decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote:
On the other side of the scale, the costs from antitrust interven-
tion might be significant. Prohibiting a seller from eliminating arbi-
trage can diminish consumer welfare and allocative efficiency in the
long run under some circumstances. For instance, a seller may
charge different prices to favored and disfavored consumers in or-
der to recover the common costs of serving both sets of consumers.
See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out En-
trants are not Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs
and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 732–33 (2003). If the seller
cannot eliminate arbitrage, its sales to the disfavored (and higher-
paying) consumers might be significantly—if not completely—un-
dercut by the reseller to the extent that the seller can no longer
recoup its common costs. As a result, the seller might choose not to
incur common costs that are necessary for the development of eco-
nomically beneficial facilities.87
It may be generous to regard this article as influential in that what the
author describes is both logical and a simple economic reality. How-
ever, in our classification of articles, an effort was made to be as gen-
erous as possible.
85. These examples are only of specific instances. The same articles may have
been cited in other opinions and received a different classification if those cases had
been part of the sample.
86. Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive out Entrants Are Not
Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J.
681 (2003).
87. Metronet Servs. v. Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004).
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An example of an article in the second category is Orin Kerr’s In-
ternet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother
that Isn’t.88 Here the court writes:
The Stored Communications Act is part of that legislation and al-
lows authorities to obtain a court order compelling disclosure of
noncontent records, including subscriber information and connec-
tion data, that are “relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), (d); see Orin S. Kerr, Internet
Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother that
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 611 (2003).89
As noted, the last category involved instances in which there did not
appear to be specific reasoning or information found in the article that
the court found useful. In these cases, the citation seemed more to be
along the line of a typical law review citation in which readers are
directed to a source, sometimes among many, that is consistent with
the court’s view. An example is Ronald J. Sievert’s War on Terrorism
or Global Enforcement Operation?,90 which is cited in the following
excerpt:
Public issues certainly include fomenting revolution in neighboring
countries, the invasion of foreign nations, the assassination of en-
emy leaders, and preserving the freedom of speech in this nation
with which to continue advocacy for the above. See Charles
Krauthammer, Essay: Should the U.S. Support the Contras?, TIME,
Mar. 2, 1987 (“Guerrilla war is always morally problematic . . . but is
it wrong to support a resistance seeking to overthrow the rule of the
comandantes? Americans value freedom in their own country. They
would not tolerate the political conditions that Nicaraguans must
suffer.”); Ann Coulter, This is War, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE,
Sept. 13, 2001 (“We should invade their countries, kill their leaders
and convert them to Christianity.”); Ronald J. Sievert, War on Ter-
rorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
88. Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big
Brother that Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607 (2003).
89. United States v. Thousand, 558 F. App’x 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2014). Similar to
this is the following:
This sort of comparison is foreign to most sentencing regimes. In the wake
of Payne, the federal government, the military, and thirty-three of the thirty-
eight states with the death penalty have authorized the use of victim impact
evidence in capital sentencing. John H. Blume, Ten Years of Payne: Victim
Impact Evidence in Capital Cases, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 257, 267 (2003).
Humphries v. Ozmint, 366 F.3d 266, 274 (4th Cir. 2004), rev’d en banc, 397 F.3d 206
(4th Cir. 2005). An overzealous defender of the status quo may interpret this to mean
the cited work was without value. That is hardly the case. Efforts that involve count-
ing can be valuable, but whether they justify the relatively high salaries of law profes-
sors is another matter.
90. Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Enforcement Operation?,
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 307 (2003).
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REV. 307, 313–17 (2003) (discussing academic and political endorse-
ments of the United State’s [sic] use of assassination).91
The frequency of influence can be put into a different perspective.
When principal law reviews are combined with secondary reviews (a
sample of 291 articles) a total of 126 judicial cites were found. This
does not mean that 126 articles were cited in cases. In fact, 64 of the
nearly 291 articles were responsible for all of the judicial cites. In ef-
fect, an article had roughly a 20% chance of being cited for any reason
at all over the time period examined. Of the 100 actual citations ex-
amined, about 20% were instances in which a court appeared to have
been influenced by the work it cited.92
Surely, this understates the actual impact. Courts (hopefully) do not
cite everything that is influential. Indeed, an attorney may discover an
argument in a law review article and use it to influence a court without
the source of the argument ever being revealed. Moreover, judges
may have learned something in law school that their teachers learned
by reading law review articles. No doubt a full accounting for usage
and citation would exceed the relatively modest levels presented here.
In addition, as noted earlier, we suspect that the topic or subject mat-
ter of the scholarship is important in determining its impact.
5. What it Means to be Cited: Scholarship
An effort was also made to assess the ways in which scholarship was
relied upon in other scholarship. To this end, 100 instances of citation
of the articles in the sample by other authors were examined.93 One
citation to the first article in the sample that was cited in another arti-
cle was examined and so on down the list. One hundred cites were
found before exhausting the list of 98 articles. The actual cite ex-
amined was usually the one found in the center of the list when ar-
ranged by date. Thus, if an article had 20 citations, the tenth citation
was selected. There were exceptions to this when that citation was not
in a traditional law review or when the citation was a self-citation.
Classifying the use of the citation in a scholarly work was more dif-
ficult than in the case of judicial cites. It is impossible to determine
with confidence to what extent the author of the citing work actually
relied on what was found in the cited work. Law review articles have
excessive citation and this may mean much of the influence is re-
vealed. This is complicated, however, by the possibility, even likeli-
hood, that some citations are inserted by law review editors
themselves or by authors simply to appease law review editors who
91. United States v. White, No. 7:08-CR-00054, 2010 WL 438088, at *14 (W.D. Va.
Feb. 4, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 670 F.3d 498 (4th Cir. 2012).
92. It is important to remember that this probability reflects only the first eight to
ten years of an article’s life.
93. Fifty additional cites were examined as part of a “control group.” See infra
Section III.A.6.
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are wedded to the notion that even the most obvious statements re-
quire support.
For purposes of this study, there was no alternative other than to
assume that all of the cites were included by the authors or with the
authors’ permission. Ultimately, three imprecise categories were se-
lected. First, were the instances in which the cited work is actually
mentioned or discussed in the text in a manner that makes it clear that
the author was responding to or building on the prior work. For con-
venience, this is called “substantive reliance.” Second, there were in-
stances in which a cited work was noted because it included a factual
statement or an opinion and was referenced by the author, but the
cited work did not appear to play a role otherwise. Many of these cites
constituted a version of hearsay in that the author was asserting a fact
or an opinion and supported it by noting that someone else had made
the same assertion.94 It is hard to view these cites as true authority for
the statement made by the author, but the practice is common among
legal scholars. The final group was composed of instances in which it
was difficult to connect the citation in any substantive way to the work
of the author or to any specific assertion for which the citation was
authority. “Casual notation” is an accurate label for this classification.
In the survey of 100, two citations fell in the “substantive reliance”
group. The 98 remaining citations fell evenly within the second two
categories. The line between these two categories was difficult to
draw, and another person analyzing the data or even a second analysis
by the current researchers could result in a different count. Neverthe-
less, virtually all of the citations examined fell into the hearsay or cas-
ual notation categories. It was rare to find an author who engaged the
material found in the cited work.
The difficulty of classification and the general conclusion that law
professors are not consistently building on the works of others can be
illustrated with some examples. As noted, only two works were
viewed as having been seriously influenced by the existence of the
work they cited. One of these is Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to
Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, by Oren Gross.95 The citing
work is Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Charting a Method to Reduce
94. But cf. Barton, supra note 42, at 201 (arguing that law review articles are less
likely to publish “false information” because of student editors’ demands that every
statement have support and concluding that “at a minimum, whatever an author says
[in a footnoted statement in a law review] is extremely likely to be true”). But see
Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV.
167, 167–72 (2004) (arguing that legal scholars and law review editors do not possess
sufficient expertise to evaluate the accuracy or reliability of empirical research).  Pos-
sibly the most egregious example of this, or at least the most ironic, is supporting the
notion that citations equal impact by noting that others have made the same state-
ment. See Sisk et. al, supra note 59, at 12 n.17.
95. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003).
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Madness in Post-9/11 Power and Rights Conflicts, by Mario Barnes
and F. Greg Bowman.96 In their work, Barnes and Bowman quote
Gross extensively,97 refer to his article several times,98 and rely in
their discussion on his view of the implications of emergency measures
in the wake of 9/11.
An example of the “hearsay authority” citation is found in Golden
Gate and the Ninth Circuit’s Threat to ERISA’s Uniformity and Juris-
diction.99 Here the cited article is Miriam R. Albert, Common Sense
for Common Stock Options: Inconsistent Interpretation of Anti-Dilu-
tion Provisions in Options and Warrants.100 The citation to this article
follows this statement and quotation in the text: “In a common law
system, ‘the misapplication of the principles of [a law’s] interpretation
can create bad precedents.’”101 While classified as a “hearsay” cita-
tion, it could just as easily be viewed as a casual or completely unnec-
essary cite but for the fact that it was a quotation.
The idea of casual notation may be better captured by a citation
found in Michael Moffitt’s Customized Litigation: The Case for Mak-
ing Civil Procedure Negotiable.102 The article cited is David Frisch’s
Contractual Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of Appel-
late Review.103 The citation is to the following excerpt: “The modern
trend is for courts to enforce most choice-of-law provisions in con-
tracts.”104 This is followed by the following note:
Id. at 317. For a historical analysis of the enforcement of choice-of-
law provisions in the United States, see David Frisch, Contractual
Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of Appellate Review,
56 VAND. L. REV. 57, 58–65 (2003); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E.
Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1151, 1165–68 (2000); Ribstein, supra note 117, at 370–71.105
Again, the reference to the Frisch article may be useful to the reader
and properly included, but it would be another step to conclude that
Frisch’s work influenced the thinking or analysis of Moffitt. If it did,
96. Mario L. Barnes & F. Greg Bowman, Entering Unprecedented Terrain: Chart-
ing a Method to Reduce Madness in Post-9/11 Power and Rights Conflicts, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 365 (2008).
97. Id. at 383 n.82, 393 n.127.
98. Id. at 382 n.75, 383 n.82, 384 n.84, 393 n.127, 407 n.187.
99. Landon Wade Magnusson, Note, Golden Gate and the Ninth Circuit’s Threat
to ERISA’s Uniformity and Jurisdiction, 2010 BYU L. REV. 167.
100. Miriam R. Albert, Common Sense for Common Stock Options: Inconsistent
Interpretation of Anti-Dilution Provisions in Options and Warrants, 34 RUTGERS L.J.
321 (2003).
101. Magnusson, supra note 99, at 180 (alteration in original).
102. Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Proce-
dure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007).
103. David Frisch, Contractual Choice of Law and the Prudential Foundations of
Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57 (2003).
104. Moffitt, supra note 102, at 493.
105. Id. at 493 n.119.
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given law review conventions, it seems likely that it would be cited
more frequently and for specific points or statements made in the arti-
cle. These types of citations are similar to book recommendations that
Amazon makes based on customers’ prior purchases.
6. What it Means to be Cited: Double Checking
The foregoing results showing that most citations are not substan-
tive and that few signify engagement with the cited article’s thesis
were significant because citations are often advanced as a valid mea-
sure of an article’s “impact.” The results raised a question whether the
sampling of 200 citations might have somehow produced an anoma-
lous result. For this reason, a smaller set of citations were examined to
double check the initial results. The year 2001 was chosen and every
other review in the top 100 was selected. The first article published by
that review in the first volume in 2001 was identified. Citations in law
review articles to the selected articles were determined, and one cita-
tion was selected in the manner described above. Citations to judicial
opinions were generated in the same manner.
The study of these citations replicated the results of the prior stud-
ies. Of the 50 cites to articles in cases, 5 (or 10%) were substantive.
Among the 50 cites to articles in law review articles, only 1 was sub-
stantive. Not only were the overall results similar, but the disparity
regarding the frequency of substantive citation between the law re-
view articles and cases surfaced again.106
B. Summary of Findings
Possible implications of these findings are discussed below, but it
makes sense to summarize the results. Depending on the perspective
of the reader, the results may or may not be surprising and may or
may not call for considering an alteration in the way scholarship dol-
lars are spent. Although we have our own views on these matters and
express them below, our principal purpose is to invite consideration
and debate.
1. Publishing in a top-15 law review did not correlate at a statisti-
cally significant107 level with judicial citation. In addition, judicial
citation was not found to correlate with the school from which
the author graduated or the school at which he or she was
employed.
2. Publishing in a top-15 law review correlated at a statistically sig-
nificant level with citation in a secondary source. In addition, the
106. Interestingly, these findings are consistent with a supposition made by Profes-
sor Deborah Rhode almost fifteen years ago. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1331.
107. At a 95% confidence level.
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rank of the school from which an author graduated correlated at
a statistically significant level with citation in secondary sources.
3. Among specialty journals, none of the variables examined influ-
enced citation rates by courts.
4. Among specialty journals, the rank of the school publishing the
journal and the rank of the school from which the author gradu-
ated correlated with both total and secondary citations. These
results were significant at a 90% or higher level of confidence.
5. Citation of student works in secondary sources was influenced by
the rank of school publishing the work.
6. Of a sample of 100 citations by courts to articles in the sample,
approximately 20% of the citations seemed to indicate that the
work had influenced the court’s opinion.
7. Of a sample of 100 citations by scholars to articles in the sample,
the number of instances in which the cited work was considered
as a substantive matter by the author was de minimis.
8. Of a sample of 50 citations by courts to articles in the backup
sample, approximately 10% of the citations seemed to indicate
that the work had influenced the court’s opinion.
9. Of a sample of 50 citations by scholars to articles in the backup
sample, the number of instances in which the cited work was con-
sidered as a substantive matter by the author was 2%.
In sum, and as a broad generalization, authors of secondary sources
are more inclined to cite authors who either graduated from or were
published by highly ranked schools. But it does not appear that the
substance of what was said in the cited works was of great conse-
quence to the authors who cited them in secondary sources. On the
other hand, courts cite them less frequently but tend to be more atten-
tive to the substance of a work and less influenced by the status of the
author or of the journal in which an article is found. Ironically, in law
reviews the appearance of authority is far more important than actual
authority. In addition, an author publishing in a specialty journal who
attended a highly ranked school is more likely to be cited in secondary
materials than the graduate of a lower ranked school.
Equally important as summarizing our findings is a statement of
what we are not claiming and did not find. First, correlation and cau-
sation are different matters. That legal scholars cite high-ranking jour-
nals far more regularly than others does not mean that rank causes
citation. Another explanation is that these journals may simply con-
tain more useful articles. As was noted above, there is little doubt that
editors at higher ranked journals have greater access to articles.
To repeat a qualification already noted, we have not allowed for
differences in subject matter. It may be that subject matter explains
why an article is cited by courts and by legal scholars. This is an obvi-
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ous subject for further research, but there are serious challenges to
determining the impact of subject matter in a systematic way.
We also note that much of the analysis offered here is highly subjec-
tive. Obviously, the choice to use the 100 top ranked schools as op-
posed to top ranked reviews is an example. We doubt that the
difference would affect the findings. The classification of the use of
the articles is also highly subjective. In response to that, we would
invite and be delighted if someone would reexamine the issue to see if
we have under- or overstated the impact of legal scholarship.
We know that as a general matter this analysis does little to estab-
lish the overall impact of legal scholarship and, perhaps, not even of a
specific article. For example, we have not accessed citations in works
other than those reported by Westlaw. In addition, we are aware, as
reflected in some of the comments above, that legal scholarship can
and does have an impact without any citation at all—perhaps without
any recollection by someone who has been impacted of where he or
she read something.
With respect to this point, we know of no way to assess the reliance
on legal scholarship unless that use manifests itself in writing. It is
possible, however, to make inferences about what legal scholarship is
relied on even when it is not cited. For example, people download
works from Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”) but in many
(or perhaps most) instances, they do not cite those works. They may
work in an administrative agency and be highly dependent on legal
research. In a 2006 study, Professor James Chen examined SSRN
downloads and found that the number of downloads was highly de-
pendent on the rank of the law review in which a work was ultimately
published.108 While hardly conclusive, this seems to cut against the
belief that infrequently cited articles are, nevertheless, widely relied
on by the broader range of legal professionals.109
Finally, nothing reported here bears on the quality of legal scholar-
ship in terms of the analysis and originality. No doubt most works are
the result of hours, days, and months of painstaking efforts. Authors
often draft and redraft articles, present them at workshops, and hone
them until the author is satisfied. More specifically, we do not equate
citation rates with the relative quality of the work. An article placed in
the ninety-ninth-ranked law review in 2003 would likely have many
more cites if it were in a top-15 review. Plus, it may be of equal or
better quality than more highly cited articles. Especially in the context
of reviews that are not peer reviewed and editors who are susceptible
108. Chen, supra note 55, at 39–47.
109. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1331 (“[I]t seems unlikely that articles that leave no
ripple in legal scholarship [in the form of citations] are having a substantial influence
in the world outside it.”). Empirical support for Professor Rhode’s view can be found
at Wise et al., supra note 26, at 71 (finding that judges and lawyers read law reviews
infrequently).
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to symbols of institutional authority, any inference about quality and
its relation to citations is dangerous.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS REVISITED
As previously explained, some of the common rationales for the
current state of legal scholarship may be discounted because they are
unrealistic or illogical. We postponed a full discussion of two other
more plausible justifications until presenting the empirical data be-
cause we believe a final assessment of those rationales should be in-
formed by the study’s results. Those two arguments were that: (1) the
status quo is producing legal scholarship that has a beneficial effect;
and (2) legal scholarship is a “public good.” As the following reassess-
ment explains, we actually agree with these rationales for legal schol-
ars, but the analysis does not stop there. A deeper examination
reveals that the current system misses the mark with respect to both of
the rationales.
A. Reassessing the Benefits of Legal Scholarship
Without question, legal scholarship can and does produce bene-
fits—and ultimately, this is the only important rationale for its exis-
tence. The idea that those benefits then justify current levels of
investment in scholarship is seriously flawed. The most obvious indica-
tion of this flaw is the unfortunate reality that some legal research
may actually create little or no benefit to anyone other than the au-
thors and a small handful of others. Articles about film directors110 or
the infield fly rule111 may be clever and imaginative, but almost cer-
tainly those willing—or forced—to fund legal research can find better
ways to be entertained. Highly theoretical articles are also likely to be
read or relied on by very few.112
The problem, however, is not limited to clever, witty, and theoreti-
cal articles. The fact is that some articles, though well meaning, are
just not relevant. The empirical results show that many articles in a
ten-year span are not cited by any court or author, and many that are
cited serve no useful function in helping the citing author advance or
articulate a new idea, theory, or insight. This would be of no conse-
quence if the production of this scholarship did not give rise to direct
expenses in terms of salaries and implicate opportunity costs in terms
110. See Jeffrey L. Harrison & Amy R. Mashburn, Jean-Luc Godard and Critical
Legal Studies (Because We Need the Eggs), 87 MICH. L. REV. 1924 (1989) (comparing
French New Wave cinema and Critical Legal Studies).
111. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Economics of the Infield Fly Rule, 2013 UTAH
L. REV. 479 (2013).
112. There are examples of brilliant people writing complex pieces that are very
difficult to understand and are rarely, if ever, cited. There appears to be no utility in
providing examples, but this can be verified by simply selecting several articles with
long or grand titles and then subjecting them to a Westlaw search.
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of other uses for the funding and professors’ time. If one agrees that
the benefits (however defined) of some articles do not exceed their
costs, then in technical terms there exists a surplus or oversupply of
legal scholarship.113
Based on statistics found in this Article and other places,114 one
might conclude that this oversupply is found in the scholarship pub-
lished in lower ranked journals. The unfortunate truth is that, regard-
less of their quality, it is unlikely that articles in those publications
would be missed. This observation is more compelling when one re-
calls that this study considered only the top 100 reviews.
The problem is that, even if there were fewer journals, there is little
reason to believe that law professors, as a consequence of natural in-
clination or institutional pressure, would not simply compete for those
fewer outlets. So, yes, some of the expense of scholarship would be
saved by not incurring the cost of making available unlikely-to-be-
read articles.115 But that does little to harness the more expensive side
of the equation, which deals with producing the scholarship. Moreo-
ver, such a measure would be vastly under-inclusive. High placement
does not always mean high citations,116 and high citation counts do not
mean the article has any demonstrable value.117
If the focus is switched from too many reviews to too many writers
or writing, the issue becomes one of “false positives” and “false nega-
tives.” An article that is published but has little meaning or usefulness
is a “false positive.” On the other hand, it is possible that limiting the
investment in legal scholarship would mean some very useful articles
would not be written at all. This is the case of “false negatives.” Any
rational approach to the problem of excessive investment would strive
to limit both false positives and false negatives.
One might take this to mean that, since false positives are more
likely to be found in lower ranked journals, there is further support
for discontinuing or limiting publications from lower ranked schools.
This argument ignores the circularity built into the system of assessing
impact. Both “false positives” and “true positives” (defined as pub-
lished articles that receive citations) may not be a function of anything
related to actual value. For example, the fact that an article is a false
positive may be a function of where it is published as much as the
subject matter and execution of the article itself. Placed in a higher
ranked journal, the very same article may not be a false positive at all
113. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1331 (“Baldly stated, the uncomfortable truth is that
too much of legal scholarship now produced is of little use to anyone.”).
114. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 55.
115. The various means of making articles available online may mean many, if not
all, printed journals will eventually become obsolete.
116. See supra Section III.B. Although high placement was correlated with higher
citation rates, overall citation rates—even among articles in top-level reviews—were
meager.
117. See supra discussion within Sections III.A.4–6.
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but appear to be hugely positive. Somehow, labeling an article as a
false positive—which may result from poor or biased editorial deci-
sions based on the status of the author and where the article was pub-
lished—seems unlikely to advance the goal of making the best
possible investment decisions. Ironically, the system itself determines
which articles will be false positive by virtue of its robotic tenden-
cies.118 In reality, controlling false positives requires better choices by
authors and better choices by editors, whether they are students or
not.
Alternatively, some true positives are actually false positives in dis-
guise. The publication and citation of an article does not mean it
should have been published from the standpoint of a rational alloca-
tion of resources. An article may appear to be a positive simply be-
cause of where it was published. In a ninety-ninth-ranked journal, the
same article might not have been cited at all. Plus, even in a top 10
and widely cited journal, it may not actually be of much use.
Richard Posner attempts to defend legal scholarship by using an
analogy that compares the thousands of law review articles written to
thousands of salmon swimming upstream to spawn. Many salmon, like
many law review articles, will fail. But we cannot know which ones in
advance; and the process, involving substantial losses along the way, is
necessary to perpetuate the species.119 In this sense, Judge Posner
seems to view all articles as if they were individual experiments by
laboratory scientists, mixing various compounds in an effort to find a
cure for a dread disease. The idea, of course, is that some of these
experiments will fail; but, once in a while, one will succeed, and thus,
failure is properly viewed as a necessary cost of eventual success.
Judge Posner’s view is so flawed that it borders on silly and, we as-
sume, was offered to be provocative or tongue-in-cheek.120 Neverthe-
less, there may be those who have such a starry-eyed view of legal
scholarship.
For those who agree with Judge Posner’s argument and believe law
professors are either like salmon or scientists, it is important to keep a
couple of qualifications in mind. For the most part, scientists build
from the failure of others to formulate their new experiments. This is,
at best, a small part of legal research. There is also a cost when both
law professors and scientists do research. Those costs could be less
time for teaching, counseling students, or working in a clinic. Salmon,
on the other hand, have few options as they start their upstream strug-
118. For an argument that because of the “footnote fetish” of legal scholarship, an
article’s failure to receive citations is “damning,” see Rhode, supra note 5, at 1332.
119. Richard A. Posner, The Deprofessionalization of Legal Teaching and Scholar-
ship, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1921, 1928 (1993).
120. Professor Rhode responds to Judge Posner by pointing out that Posner’s ap-
proach would condone any degree of inefficiency and arguing, instead, that legal
scholarship should not receive an economic dispensation unavailable to other endeav-
ors. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 1332–33.
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gle, and pesky opportunity costs can be put aside. Something, how-
ever, may be learned from Judge Posner’s salmon: they get one try
and then most die. In the case of law professors, writing one article in
a lifetime is an attractive option. In sum, some articles are not benefi-
cial at all; others—upstream swimming salmon aside—are beneficial
but cannot be justified based on the direct and opportunity costs.
More troubling is Judge Posner’s sense that the strongest articles—
like the strongest salmon—will make it to the top. There is no proof
that this is the case. The current standard for assessing impact—cita-
tions—is subject to a circularity problem and is misleading to the ac-
tual value of an article to the user. The biggest problem may be the
tail-wagging-the-dog impact that citation count has on legal scholar-
ship as a whole. The citation obsession may mean that works are over-
looked that have the capacity to help the consumers of legal services,
reform the law, or be otherwise helpful or transformative. Beyond
this, it is possible that the widespread pursuit for high citation num-
bers has the collective effect of reinforcing the production of certain
types of scholarship (theoretical pieces that appeal to law professors)
and discouraging others (research that might be helpful to judges, leg-
islatures, clients, etc.).
B. Reevaluating Whether Legal Scholarship is a “Public Good”
However one feels about the benefits of legal scholarship, the oft-
repeated justification that the current level is justified under a “public
good” rationale is weak. In fact, the public good argument breaks
down at two points. First, the fear with respect to legal scholarship is
that if law professors did not do it, it would not be done. In truth, this
would only be the case when private producers of the scholarship
could not internalize enough of the benefits to make the effort worth-
while. Defenders of today’s huge investment levels have yet to show
that this is always the case. In antitrust and other areas, for example,
there are huge private benefits associated with changing the law. It is
true that the benefits cannot be fully captured and that free riding
would exist, but all that is necessary for the work to exist is that pro-
ducers internalize enough of the benefit to offset the investment.
When hundreds of millions of dollars are on the line, even a modest
level of internalization would be enough.
The second place where the public good rationale breaks down con-
cerns demand. The typical public good argument is based on the as-
sumption that a demand exists but is not reflected in the market. In
other words, people do actually value the service and, if they were
somehow forced to exhibit their demand in the market, the result
would justify efforts by suppliers to produce it. Defenders of legal
scholarship have yet to exhibit or, it seems, even address the issue of
what the “hidden demand” for legal scholarship would be if it were
somehow “revealed.” Since ex ante demand cannot be determined, an
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indirect way of approaching the question is to examine how much le-
gal scholarship is relied on after it is produced. The results of this
study suggest that much of it is not regarded as useful. In effect, there
was no demand, hidden or otherwise. The public good proponents are
likely engaged in wishful thinking. More pointedly, if legal scholarship
is analogized to the construction of public roads, most of these roads
lead to nowhere.
Of course, this ex post look at usage does not equate to ex ante
demand, but this discrepancy means the news gets even worse for
those relying on the public good rationale. In a real market, people
would be required to pay. In fact, the data presented here was gath-
ered from scholarship that was given away. More directly, if it cannot
be given away once produced, it is hard to imagine the existence of a
powerful but hidden ex ante demand. In short, the public good ratio-
nale does support unquestionably some measure of legal research, but
the casual use of that rationale—one that asks tuition and tax payers
to foot the bill for a very expensive endeavor—is symptomatic of the
deficits of legal research itself.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
We fully expect many if not most law professors to resist the find-
ings of this research. The implications are threatening and the ten-
dency to rationalize the status quo when it favors our own self-interest
is almost universal. Some of that resistance may be well founded. We
have attempted to note the limits of our empirical efforts and are con-
fident that we have not identified them all. On the other hand, we also
believe that many if not most law professors at some level agree that
the law review system falls well short of an appropriate way to assess
and publicize scholarship and that much of what law professors pro-
duce has very little use. Perhaps even some doubters will join us in
debating the merits of various solutions we propose next.
In thinking about solutions, it makes sense to refer back to the com-
parison between legal research and medical research discussed in the
Introduction and ask whether incorporating aspects of research and
publication practices from other disciplines could improve legal schol-
arship. We are mindful that other disciplines have their own issues and
controversies,121 but legal scholarship seems to be singularly lacking in
substantive evaluation and accountability at any level post-tenure. In-
formed by this perspective, we have identified several measures that
are responsive to the particular problems highlighted by the results of
the empirical study.
Recommendation A echoes our previously stated desire to en-
courage critical reconsideration of the investment in scholarship as
part of any effort to reform legal education and to open a debate
121. See supra note 2.
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where all assumptions may be challenged. Recommendations B–E ad-
dress the circularity problem revealed in the empirical study by intro-
ducing mechanisms to offset the effects of institutional authority and
the unthinking attribution of meaning to citations. Recommendations
F–H focus on remedying the overproduction of legal scholarship cre-
ated solely for consumption by other law professors and the lack of
quality control over the investment of resources. Most importantly,
Recommendation G is a radical and original suggestion that law
schools fund at least some portion of legal scholarship through a grant
proposal process modeled after those in medicine and the sciences.
We believe the amount of money invested in legal scholarship, cou-
pled with the current lack of accountability of law professors and the
demonstrated limited utility of most legal scholarship, warrant such
measures.
A. Encourage Critical Debate
At a time when many of the “givens” of legal education are on the
table for reconsideration, the justification for the existing investment
in legal scholarship should be among the issues under consideration.
That debate should be informed by the results of this study and others
suggesting that the existing system is seriously flawed and that its pri-
mary beneficiaries are tenured law professors. Decision-making
should be recalibrated to ensure that the interests of other constitu-
ents are represented and advanced. We should resist subjecting critics
to ad hominem attacks, especially when they are giving voice to the
concerns and interests of those without the power and influence to
shape the future of legal education.
B. Resist the Use of Raw Citation Counts
This study shows that when it comes to the use of (or attribution of
meaning to) citations, law professors have been co-opted by a system
that is not only based on the mostly-faulty attribution of substantive
meaning to citations, but also ensures that most scholars will not suc-
ceed in the numbers game. The number of publication placements in
law reviews associated with top-ranked law schools is very limited,
given the number of law professors and the production of approxi-
mately 8,000 articles a year. Most legal scholarship will not get this
elite placement boost, and those authors will be highly unlikely to
catch up, even if the quality of their scholarship is high and its sub-
stance beneficial to the consumers of legal services. Law professors’
scholarly reputations with other law professors are not irrelevant, but
we have no reason to believe that raw citation numbers are an accu-
rate measurement of merit. Our bottom line is that law schools, as
professional schools, ought to be figuring out a way to determine and
measure the impact of legal scholarship on agencies, legislatures,
courts, attorneys, and clients. Because their investment in legal schol-
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arship is considerable, law schools should not be relying on specula-
tion, self-promotion, and numbers that have little or unclear
meaning.122
C. Increase Reliance on Peer Review
The most obvious and frequently discussed solution is some form of
peer review.123 Scholars who are subject to peer review already ex-
press concerns about bias and arbitrariness.124 It is, however, difficult
to believe that even a flawed system of peer review would not be su-
perior to students relying on institutional authority as a substitute for
quality.125 The bigger problem with peer review is that it would be in
the context of multiple submissions. Thirty or more law reviews may
be asking to have the very same article reviewed. It is not an exagger-
ation to expect scores of peer reviewers to all be examining the same
article. A modified version of peer review may be simply to ask
faculty to spend more time vetting articles, at least with respect to the
importance of the subject matter and the methodology employed.
Peer review would be more practical if each review adopted an ex-
clusive submission policy. It is possible, however, that under such a
system, lower ranked reviews would have very few or no articles to
review as authors worked their way down the review ranking. It is
hard to imagine such a radical shift in policy, but using incentives
could advance an exclusive submission policy. This incentive could be
in the form of faster response times, greater communications between
the reviews and authors, and an express policy that students would not
rely on institutional authority.126 Such a policy would also tend to
122. For an example of an effort to determine a method of evaluating the quality of
citations in another discipline, see Arago´n, supra note 2.
123. E.g., Day, supra note 23, at 581–82, 584–86.
124. Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1079–80 (2006) (asserting that peer review is flawed because,
among other things, it is blind only “in theory” and that bias and professional affilia-
tions inform the assessments of manuscripts).
125. But see Problems with Scientific Research: How Science Goes Wrong, supra
note 2 (advocating for changes in the peer-review process in scientific research after a
prominent medical journal failed to spot obvious mistakes in a publication, declaring
that because “[t]he hallowed process of peer review is not all it is cracked up to be,”
physics and mathematics have moved from peer review to a system with “post-publi-
cation . . . appended comments”); see also Mitchell, supra note 94, at 168 (“We por-
tray peer review to the public as a quasi-sacred process that helps to make science our
most objective truth teller. But we know that the system of peer review is biased,
unjust, unaccountable, incomplete, easily fixed, often insulting, usually ignorant, occa-
sionally foolish, and frequently wrong.”); id. at 176 (advocating that, instead of peer
review, law reviews adopt “stringent disclosure requirements” designed to foster criti-
cal review and replication of empirical legal research).
126. Obviously, this would not be attractive to all law professors; however, it would
likely be attractive to a majority.
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eliminate what amounts to a law review placement frenzy each spring
and fall.127
D. Implement Blind Submissions and Review
As noted, a complement to peer review is blind submission and re-
view. This removes from the process the number of times an author
has been cited, the school from which he or she graduated, and similar
types of information. The process would also ignore long, name-drop-
ping acknowledgments. Unfortunately, in the small world of legal
scholarship, even these steps may not assure true blind review. Exces-
sive self-citations or references to prior works will identify the author.
Efforts to eliminate all of these sources of information in hundreds of
articles would create a heavy burden on editors. Nevertheless, even
adopting a policy of blind submission and review—if not wholly suc-
cessful—would sensitize reviewers to the need to assess articles based
on their substance.
E. Ensure Greater Administrative Oversight of
Law Journal Management
Some have argued that law reviews should be professionally ed-
ited.128 We believe that, at a minimum, law school administrators
should ensure that the students managing the journals associated with
their institutions are not relying heavily on the institutions at which
authors teach or the schools from which authors graduated as a means
of filtering manuscripts for publication. Students should also be cau-
tioned against relying on the number of citations as a factor in deter-
mining whether to make an offer of publication. If the law school has
implemented blind submissions, obviously these measures will not be
required. In any case, faculty should routinely assist in the screening
and review process. This could take place by having multiple law re-
view advisors from different subject matter specialties who could as-
sist in screening articles for originality and the importance of the topic
to those outside the confines of legal education.
F. Gather Information from Constituents about Helpful Scholarship
Law school administrators should reach out in a meaningful way to
broader audiences for legal scholarship. They should endeavor to find
and fund ways to obtain useful information from those constituents.129
127. Because many reviews fill up, even acceptable articles may be rejected. As a
result, professors tend to think of deadlines for spring and fall submissions. Exclusive
submission would lower the number of manuscripts competing at any one time for a
spot in a review.
128. Day, supra note 23, at 584–86.
129. Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 19, at 761, 773–79 (advocating “as a matter of
necessity” increased productivity of what the authors defined as “engaged scholar-
ship” and detailing its benefits).
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These efforts should be directed at determining what their scholarship
preferences are and why. They should be asked whether they have
read and used law review articles in the past, and if not, why not. The
inquiries should not, however, be limited to the past habits of these
readers. Potential readers should be asked what type of scholarship
they would like to see and, in particular, whether empirical research
would be helpful. Other suggestions include seeking diverse sources to
fund more engaged or practical research.130 One possible alternative
avenue for making scholarship responsive to the needs of non-law
professor consumers and inexpensively available to those without un-
limited access to Westlaw (a subsidy for law professors), would be to
expand and use the law library’s online article posting system to make
unpublished—but potentially more helpful—articles by faculty availa-
ble and accessible.
G. Create a System that Incentivizes More Helpful Scholarship
Whatever its merits, peer review in any form falls well short of a
purpose- or task-oriented approach to legal research and may do very
little to influence the supply side of the legal scholarship “market.”
The onus for that falls on law professors and law school administrators
who have permitted an incentive structure to develop and persist that
at times seems only tangentially related to assisting those who actually
practice and make decisions about law.131 Law professors, knowing
that tenure, status, and salary are a function of impressing other law
professors, strive to do just that.132 The challenge is to alter the reward
structure so that even the most self-interested law professor will find
writing for identifiable needs more attractive. By “needs” we do not
mean only those topics that have immediate relevance for practition-
ers. There are, for example, more general needs that may lead to test-
ing hypotheses and theories in a scientific way. A corollary is to
encourage productivity in a greater range of beneficial activities other
than legal scholarship.133
An element of the problem is that law professors are unaccountable
for their decisions about how to spend scarce research dollars. A re-
lease from teaching of one-fourth time or more may be conditional on
actually producing something, but the release seems unconditional on
whether what is produced makes a difference. In effect, release time is
130. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1359.
131. Professor Larry Cata´ Backer has suggested, in a related context, that the law
professor “putting forward some contribution to the scholarly enterprise should bear
the burden of articulating, in a specific way, the means or methods by which it can be
measured.” Larry Cata´ Backer, Defining, Measuring, and Judging Scholarly Produc-
tivity: Working Toward a Rigorous and Flexible Approach, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 317,
329 (2002).
132. Rhode, supra note 5, at 1342.
133. Id. at 1333, 1358–59 (stating that the academy should “reward[ ] a diverse
range of contributions”).
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comparable to a grant to do research in a medical field. By contrast, in
legal education that grant is made without an application or proposal,
without identifying the purpose of the research, without a methodol-
ogy, and without identifying the relevant audience.134 Given this dis-
cretion, law professors write for those who can do the most for them
personally—other law professors.135 They are not held accountable if
their efforts to impress other law professors are successful in the form
of citations to their articles and other tangible manifestations of that
“impact,” including speaking invitations, etc.
Although the change would be radical, one way for legal research to
become more focused is for funding to be made available on a project-
by-project basis after a proposal is submitted, reviewed, and ap-
proved.136 Ideally, that proposal would require all of the elements
listed above. General proposals like “I think I will write about the
Fourth Amendment” would be rejected. Very theoretical works likely
to appeal to only a few would be given lower priority. Works designed
to identify pressing problems and seek solutions would be given prior-
ity. It is not clear that shifting the incentive structure this way would
curb the excesses of those writing persistently about “efficient
134. Id. at 1347 (noting that legal scholarship is “seldom calculated to reach the
public”).
135. Id. at 1342 (“[P]rofessors write mainly for each other, [and] they face little
pressure to address the problems that practitioners or the public find most urgent or
to identify solutions that have some realistic chance of adoption.”).
136. In an article defining what factors a law school should consider before giving a
publication credit as meeting an institutional requirement for scholarship, Professor
Larry Cata´ Backer provides guidance on the information that such proposals might
contain. He proposes that scholarship:
(1) must be consciously directed, and [the] anticipated value must be articul-
able with some specificity.
(2) must be measurable in some articulable way.
(3) must be part of an effort that is transparent . . . .
(4) must demonstrate substantial personal effort . . . .
(5) must be directed outward from the particular law school to the academy,
legislature, bar, or other constituency as well as inward for the benefit of the
school.
(6) must in some clearly articulable way . . . help to fulfill the obligations of
teaching and service.
(7) must not strive [to create or contribute to] a monopoly of knowledge. . . .
[and]
(8) must serve as the basis for a consistently applied system of review.
Backer, supra note 131, at 328 (emphasis added).
Professor Backer also recommends a set of matching questions that faculty, as part
of a review process, should have to answer about their scholarship. These include:
“Specify[ing] the standard for measuring your scholarly activity and explain[ing] how
it should be applied”; and “Explain[ing] how your scholarly activity has been directed
outward to the academy, the legislature, the bar, etc. How exactly have your scholarly
efforts benefited the school and your colleagues?” Id. at 340.
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breaches,”137 “skyhooks,”138 and other imaginary things, but at the
margin it may make a difference.139
H. Educate Peer Reviewers
These changes are a significant departure from the culture and tra-
dition in legal education. Untenured faculty who opt to write articles
that appeal to an audience broader than other law professors might be
vulnerable to negative peer reviews and challenges by tenure and pro-
motion committees. It will be important to be transparent about the
deliberateness of the change in direction and to protect vulnerable
faculty in this process.
VI. CONCLUSION
However one reacts to these proposals for change, one should con-
cede at the very least that the burden of maintaining the status quo
must be on those who favor continuing it. Massive expenditures,
which mean larger classes, fewer courses, and heavier burdens on tax
and tuition payers, cannot be justified by faith-based observations that
we just “know” our work is useful. Nor can it be justified by writing
solely for other law professors. Finally, the status quo cannot be justi-
fied by a system of scholarship dissemination that depends on institu-
tional authority and efforts to enhance the ranking of law reviews.
Obviously, ultimate impact cannot be quantified, but responsible law
professors and administrators are able to and should justify subsidiza-
tion in clear terms rather than connect expenditures to identifiable
needs.
The state of legal scholarship could be otherwise, but the existing
system is strongly self-perpetuating, and change will be difficult. Our
goal is to encourage legal educators to strive harder to make the sub-
stantial investment in legal scholarship more meaningful from the per-
spective of someone other than a law professor. Making this type of
directional change now will be particularly difficult because tenured
law professors feel besieged by attacks on legal education from all
directions and their reaction may be to become entrenched in defen-
sive rationalizing. We believe, however, that most law professors, with
137. See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New
Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939 (2011).
138. See generally Monroe H. Freedman, A Critique of Philosophizing About Law-
yers’ Ethics, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 91, 104 (2012) (comparing “philosophical theo-
rizing about lawyers’ ethics, based upon unrealistic facts and the omission of critical
authorities” to structural engineers debating “whether using skyhook cables that drop
magically from the sky would be a better way of building bridges than the present
suspension method”).
139. Some may regard this as a matter of academic freedom. It is doubtful that
professors would be free to write anything and to use law school resources to do so.
See supra text accompanying notes 136–38.
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proper incentives, would be willing to rethink their scholarship if law
school administrators made this a priority.140
140. Wise et al., supra note 26, at 18–19, 65 n.245 (reporting the results of a survey
showing that law professors are dissatisfied with their failure to meet the needs of
attorneys and judges).
